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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, I demonstrate that wholeheartedness is a constitutive intellectual virtue.
Wholeheartedness consists of a definite and unified volitional structure in which one’s
desires are integrated around union with God and which contributes to one’s personal
intellectual worth by positively orienting her toward acquaintance with God. Since
wholeheartedness consists of a hierarchy of the will that prioritizes a desire for union
with God, wholeheartedness aims towards the epistemic good of acquaintance. By
desiring that one have a will that wills union with God, she cooperates with God toward
wholeheartedness. As one becomes aware of her volitional structure changing, she also
becomes aware of God’s presence. This sanctification produces a pattern of interactions
with God overtime that constitute an acquaintance with God, where acquaintance is an
aptitude of recognition, belief formation, and understanding carried via memory and
other faculties that is consequent on and subsequent to an earlier immediate cognitive
contact or awareness of an object of knowledge. It is in and through one becoming
wholehearted that she comes to know God.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
What role does wholeheartedness play in acquiring knowledge of God? In this
thesis, I argue that wholeheartedness is a constitutive intellectual virtue that yields
knowledge of God by acquaintance. I advance this thesis in three major steps. First, I
demonstrate that wholeheartedness is an intellectual virtue insofar as it has its own
unique psychological characteristics and aims at knowledge of God by acquaintance. I
will then illustrate how the process of becoming wholehearted is indispensable to
becoming acquainted with God. Lastly, I will conclude with a response to Paul Moser’s
volitional theistic evidentialism by demonstrating how my account of wholeheartedness
streamlines his religious epistemology.
However, before moving onto to the primary claim of this thesis, I want to define
certain terms that the project presupposes. In the following pages, I will lay out the theory
of intellectual virtue into which I situate wholeheartedness and discuss acquaintance with
God as an epistemic good at which wholeheartedness is aimed. I will also explain how
my question arises from the confluence of three areas of conversation: efforts within
epistemology to show a connection between the formation of the self and the acquisition
of knowledge, the role spiritual formation plays in the life of the mind, and current
projects that deal directly with the role Christian spiritual formation plays in acquiring
knowledge of God. Lastly, I will explain my methodology, including the flow of
argumentation, the reason for incorporating certain thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas and
1

Eleonore Stump, and any necessary caveats to keep the primary aim of this project at the
fore.
Intellectual Virtue as Personal Intellectual Worth
I will be situating wholeheartedness into Jason Baehr’s theory of intellectual
virtue, that is, his account of the basic nature and structure of an intellectual virtue.1 The
advantage of utilizing Baehr’s theory is that it endorses a pluralism concerning kinds or
concepts of intellectual virtue. Under Baehr’s theory of intellectual virtue, there is more
than one way in which a character trait can qualify as an intellectual virtue or more than
one substantive criterion for the possession of an intellectual virtue. This pluralism in
conceptualizing different traits as intellectual virtues paves the way for making the case
that lesser known traits such as wholeheartedness have an epistemic dimension.2
This theory states that intellectual virtues can be understood as “personal
intellectual excellences,” or traits that contribute to their possessor’s “personal
intellectual worth.”3 Traits such as inquisitiveness, attentiveness, carefulness,
thoroughness in inquiry, open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, and intellectual rigor,
honesty, and courage are typically understood to be the primary traits that constitute
intellectual virtues.4 The conceptual basis of intellectual virtue, or what ultimately makes
1. Jason Baehr, The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2011), 47. Baehr fits his theory of intellectual virtue into what he calls Weak
Conservative Virtue Epistemology (VE), which states that there are at least some conceptual connections
between intellectual virtue and traditional epistemology, although these connections do not overhaul the
central questions and concerns of traditional epistemology.
2. Baehr, The Inquiring Mind, 89.
3. Baehr, The Inquiring Mind, 47. As a virtue “responsibilist,” unlike that of a virtue “reliabilist,”
Baehr conceives intellectual virtues as excellences of intellectual character. So the intellectual virtues
considered by Baehr and me do not include and cannot be reduced to natural cognitive faculties such as
memory, reason, vision, introspection, or the like.
4. Baehr, The Inquiring Mind, 89.
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a trait such as open-mindedness or intellectual courage substantial intellectual virtues, is
the notion of “personal worth,” that is, the notion of being a “good person” or of being
good qua person. In other words, intellectual virtues can be understood as “offshoots or
manifestations” of personal excellence. From this point of view, the traits in question are
virtues, not merely from the standpoint of truth or reliability, but also from the standpoint
of personal worth or excellence.5
It is already a part of ordinary discourse and thinking to make judgments aimed at
marking a contrast between a person’s worth or excellence qua person and his excellence
in some other respect. For example, a person can be perceived as a terrific X (athlete,
musician, artist, philosopher, theologian, etc.), while he is also perceived as a rotten
person. This general formulation can also be reversed, where an individual is considered
good or admirable qua person but weak or defective with one or another respect. As such,
the notion of personal worth picks out a distinctive kind of excellence—one that may or
may not be accompanied by various other kinds of excellences.6
At first glance, it may seem that personal worth is merely a moral notion: that to
be good is just to be morally good in some respect. However, personal worth or
excellence has an intellectual dimension as well, and this is best demonstrated through
examples of intellectual admiration.7 The examples of intellectual admiration with which
we are most concerned are instances where one is admired for his deep and abiding desire

5. Baehr, The Inquiring Mind, 91.
6. Baehr, The Inquiring Mind, 92.
7. Baehr, The Inquiring Mind, 92.
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for knowledge and understanding.8 We admire this person because as a result of this
desire, he is regularly willing to give a fair and honest hearing to the “other side,” to
persevere in his search for the truth, to entertain counterevidence to his beliefs in an open
and patient way, and to refrain from caricaturing or distorting positions he rejects. We
could so much as claim that he is a better person qua person and that he functions
epistemically well on account of the qualities just noted. Yet at the same time, we would
not be compelled to say that he is a morally better person on account of these qualities.9
So the value in question is distinctively intellectual or cognitive, for it pertains to
cognitive ends such as truth, knowledge, evidence, rationality, and understanding. But at
the same time, it is also relevant to personal worth.10 Therefore, intellectual virtues are
just character traits that make their possessor good or excellent in the relevant intellectual
and personal way.11
Personal intellectual worth is also clear from instances of intellectual admiration
where the basis of these relevant qualities is a matter of what one desires, loves, or
identifies with. More specifically, it is a function of the extent to which one, in a
psychological sense, is positively oriented toward or loves what is good and negatively

8. Baehr, The Inquiring Mind, 92-93. There is also a sense in which we admire a person for her
excellent cognitive faculties and capacities for things like formal or abstract thought. However, since one
can have an extraordinarily high IQ and still be a vicious person, these examples do not fall into the domain
of value we are concerned with.
9. Baehr, The Inquiring Mind, 93.
10. Baehr, The Inquiring Mind, 94-95. Baehr strongly maintains that there is a fundamental
difference between personal worth in this sense and a kind of inherent value or dignity ascribed to every
human person, in virtue of them being persons. Personal worth refers to a further and distinct way in which
persons can (but need not) be good or excellent. Baehr is not suggesting that some people are “worth more”
or “more valuable” than others.
11. Baehr, The Inquiring Mind, 93.
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oriented toward what is bad or wrong.12 This formulation suggests that the relationship
between oneself and the relevant kind of value is principally an “internal” or
psychological one.13 Thus intellectual personal worth is a matter of “loving” what is good
or desiring that it obtain and “hating” what is bad or desiring that it not obtain.14
Furthermore, this orientation considers strength or degree. If a person has only a
weak preference for the good, then this orientation may not have any bearing on her
personal worth. As such, the orientation in question must be strong enough that it actually
motivates its possessor to choose or act on behalf of the good.15 Additionally, this basis
for personal intellectual worth should be understood as requiring that a person be
positively oriented toward the good and negatively oriented toward the bad for her own
sake. In other words, one cannot be oriented towards a particular good merely because
this end happens to be causally related to some other end that is bad or neutral.16
This formulation is specifically epistemic in nature when one is said to be
positively orientated around what is intellectually good. This means that a person
enhances her personal intellectual worth when she desires epistemic goods such as true

12. Baehr, The Inquiring Mind, 96.
13. Baehr, The Inquiring Mind, 97. This is opposed to the suggestion that the principle relation
between these two is a causal one. As Baehr points out, this is problematic mainly because whether we
succeed in bringing about the good consequences or states of affairs at which we aim is often largely a
matter of luck and not entirely within our immediate control. So what seems relevant to the basis of
personal worth is not what a person obtains but what she aims at.
14. Baehr, The Inquiring Mind, 98.
15. Baehr, The Inquiring Mind, 98-99. However, this condition must be qualified because there are
various ways in which desires that do contribute to personal worth might fail to be motivating. Baehr cites
the presence of countervailing values that may be at stake or external forces that might prevent one from
acting on the relevant desire. Therefore, the orientation appealed to should be understood as being
reasonably strong or intense, so that, when considered in its own right, it will likely prove motivating.
16. Baehr, The Inquiring Mind, 99.
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belief, understanding, and acquaintance in a way that is motivating and intrinsic.17 This
also applies to the inverse, so that a person who desires epistemic goods also desires to
avoid epistemic failures such as false belief, ignorance, and irrationality.18 So the account
of intellectual virtue operative in this thesis can be summarized as follows: “an
intellectual virtue is a character trait that contributes to its possessor’s personal
intellectual worth on account of its involving a positive psychological orientation toward
epistemic goods.”19
This account of intellectual virtue sets up a viable framework in which
wholeheartedness may be considered an intellectual virtue that yields knowledge of God
by acquaintance. According to this theory, it is reasonable to regard character traits as
intellectual excellences that contribute to their possessor’s personal intellectual worth.
Secondly, this account covers a wide range of putative virtues. If it is entirely plausible to
consider traits such as inquisitiveness, attentiveness, intellectual courage, honesty,
fairness, and openness as contributing to their possessor’s personal intellectual worth,
then we can proceed confidently with our consideration of wholeheartedness as an
intellectual virtue.20
Knowledge by Acquaintance as an Epistemic Good
Another important aspect of an intellectual virtue is that, like any other
intellectual activity, it has aims that are considered epistemic goods. Generally accepted
17. In the section that follows, I will explain what is meant by acquittance and why I consider it an
epistemic good on par with true belief and understanding.
18. Baehr, The Inquiring Mind, 101.
19. Baehr, The Inquiring Mind, 102.
20. Baehr, The Inquiring Mind, 105.
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epistemic goods include things such as true, justified belief; warrant; truth; knowledge;
and rationality. However, in our consideration of wholeheartedness as an intellectual
virtue, there is good cause to expand upon these traditional, belief-oriented epistemic
goods because not all epistemic goods are concerned with the warrant or justification of
beliefs.
We sometimes seek to enhance our epistemic life by way of the immediacy of
experience, which yields knowledge-for-oneself. We can contrast this to instances of
second-hand knowledge, where an item of knowledge has been acquired from another
person, or speaker.21 It is sometimes the case that our knowledge of any given object or
subject can be supplemented by experience of the object of knowledge. For example, I
can be an expert on the architectural design and engineering of the Temple Expiatori de
la Sagrada Família without ever having been to Spain. Yet it is intuitive to most that, if I
were to hop on a plane to Spain and visit the Sagrada Família, I would somehow be
supplementing even my expert knowledge.22 It could be the case that such immediate
experiences do, in fact, give me new beliefs or improve the warrant for my incumbent
21. Benjamin McMyler, Testimony, Trust, and Authority (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011),
46. Typically, we take testimony to be an instance of second-hand knowledge. For example, imagine that I
am waiting for the 5:00 pm train at the station but there is no clock near me, and I am without a watch.
However, I need to know what time it is in order to determine if I have missed my train or not. I lean over
to the person next to me, who I noticed is wearing a watch and ask him what time it is. He informs me that
it is 4:55 pm. It turns out that it actually is 4:55 pm and therefore, I know second-hand from the stranger
next to me that it is 4:55 pm. In this scenario, the stranger at the station plays an epistemically significant
role in my knowing what time it is. So when pressed on how I know what time it is, through my epistemic
right of deferral, I am justified in claiming that I know what time it is. Epistemologists still debate whether
testimony generates knowledge. Some epistemologists have gone the Locke/Hume route and reduce
testimonial knowledge to other epistemic capacities such as inference. However, other epistemologists have
taken the Reidian route and compare testimonial knowledge to irreducible and basic capacities such as
perception. For purposes of this thesis, it suffices to say that second-hand knowledge, in contrast to
knowledge-for-oneself, is mediated by another person, or speaker. For further reading on the epistemic
issues of testimony, see McMyler’s Testimony, Trust, and Authority.
22. Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood, Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative
Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 33.
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beliefs about the Sagrada Família, but this does not fully encompass the aim for wanting
to experience the church for myself. Consequently, through this immediate experience of
the church, I become acquainted with the building, design, and architecture, so that I
understand and perceive the richness and aesthetics of the church better.
Since this experience contributes to one’s understanding, the experience and level
of perception that results from it carries with it an epistemic dimension. Even if this
acquaintance does not contribute to mere knowledge, it is still considered an epistemic
good insofar as it contributes to one’s understanding and perceptual judgments. This is
because intervening personal experiences contribute to one’s perspective so that it
becomes deeper, broader, and richer than before those experiences took place.23 So the
epistemic goods that we aim for must encompass more than mere propositions or true,
justified beliefs.
Although there is a distinction between epistemic goods such as knowledge,
understanding, acquaintance, and wisdom, they are not isolated from each other. While
these goods cannot be collapsed together, they are interrelated and build upon one
another. While something such as acquaintance cannot be reduced to propositional
knowledge, it is not entirely separated from it in either the warrant of beliefs or in
understanding.24 In other words, these epistemic goods are considered aspects of

23. Roberts and Wood, Intellectual Virtues, 33. This intuition echoes the classical thought
experiment first penned by Franck Jackson of Mary, the neuroscientist, who is omniscient regarding facts
about the human brain and how it processes color, but has never experienced color for herself (Franck
Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” Philosophical Quarterly 32, no. 137 (April 1982): 127-36). The
question to ask is, would the perceptual experience of color add anything to Mary’s already omniscient
knowledge of color?
24. There are philosophers, such as Hintikka, who will disagree that ascriptions of acquaintance
can be considered as anything but reducible or otherwise dependent on ascriptions of propositional
knowledge. However, this is neither here nor there, as it is not my aim to debate whether this is the case.
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knowledge rather than isolated kinds or types of knowledge.25 However, for the sake of
brevity, in this thesis I will use the terms “knowledge of God by acquaintance” and
“acquaintance” as umbrella terms that encompass these epistemic goods (i.e., knowledge,
understanding, acquaintance, and wisdom) while maintaining their distinctiveness. I do
this to avoid dismissing the role and importance of mere knowledge (i.e., propositional,
memorial, and sensory knowledge). Yet the emphasis of this thesis will be on those
epistemic goods that one acquires in degrees, such as understanding and perceptual
judgments. Therefore, when I refer to “knowledge of God by acquaintance,” or “knowing
God,” I am mainly concerned with one’s understanding and spiritual perception of God.
So when the claim is made that wholeheartedness aims at knowledge of God by
acquaintance, I am not necessarily referring to mere knowledge of God.26
Specifically, acquaintance is an aptitude of recognition, belief formation, and
understanding carried via memory and other faculties that is consequent on and
subsequent to an earlier immediate cognitive contact or awareness of an object of
knowledge.27 This expresses the intuition we hold when we say a person has a cognitive
advantage because she is experienced in a field or trade of some kind. A simple example
of acquaintance includes sensory perception, but acquaintance is not exhausted by or

25. Roberts and Wood, Intellectual Virtues, 33-34.
26. Just as in the example of the Sagrada Família, personal experience of God could yield
propositional knowledge or improve the warrant of incumbent beliefs about God. This knowledge-foroneself of God may even correct or change one’s beliefs about God. Regardless, the epistemic goods
entailed within acquaintance that I am most concerned about in this project will primarily be understanding
and nonsensory perception.
27. Roberts and Wood, Intellectual Virtues, 42-49. I am also operating with Roberts and Wood’s
definition of understanding, where understanding has a similar relationship to truth and can be directed at
propositions, but also encompasses non-propositional things. In this thesis, I am predominantly interested
in the deepening levels of perceptual judgments that result from immediate experience.
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limited to this immediate cognitive contact.28 What appears to be mere deliverance of
perceptual inputs to the senses may actually be complex constructions of beliefs,
propositions, perceptions, and traits that exhibit something more like understanding. For
example, when I become aurally acquainted with a Brahms theme, it is not clear that I
come to believe anything new. However, the training of the senses to identify a particular
object or the attunement of concerns and desires conditions what is perceived or paid
attention to.29
For example, there are two equally intelligent people witnessing a member of a
racial minority group being subtly directed away from a majority-race neighborhood
where he would like to buy a home. Both observers know that what is happening in the
scenario is an instance of racial discrimination. However, one observer feels indignant
because he clearly perceives the injustice of the situation. The other observer does not
feel indignant and so does not perceive or understand the situation in the same way as the
indignant observer. The indifferent observer does not appreciate the injustice, feel it, or
perceive it. She has a notional understanding of the action as an injustice, but in a moral
or spiritual sense there is something she is not “getting.” Roberts and Wood claim that the
emotional response, along with its perception and understanding, is an indispensable
vehicle for acquaintance.30 In this case, the perception of the indignant observer depends
upon a complex background of beliefs, understanding, and concerns (i.e., desires,
28. Roberts and Wood, Intellectual Virtues, 51.
29. Roberts and Wood, Intellectual Virtues, 52. This is assuming that one meets the basic
conditions for knowledge, which entails fully functional and reliable cognitive faculties.
30. I understand that this point brings up the issue of epistemic emotions or the role emotions may
play in the epistemic life. Many others have written in depth on this subject and it is not my goal here to go
into any detail, as that would be an entirely new thesis project. For further reading see, Michael S. Brady,
Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
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volitional orientation, inclination, etc.) that we can assume has been refined and
cultivated over time.31 Furthermore, due to the indignant observer’s acquaintance, he will
be ready and willing to act in a praiseworthy way.
By this acquaintance we come to a greater perceptual awareness, recognition, and
understanding of God. In this sense we come to “know” God. Since the perception
entailed within acquaintance depends upon a complex background of knowledge, beliefs,
and concerns, the understanding it yields can be indefinitely more right, more adequate,
and progressively closer to the truth. This is certainly the case given that God, as the
object of acquaintance, is infinite. Therefore, knowledge of God by acquaintance comes
in degrees. 32
The conception of acquaintance as an epistemic good that encompasses
knowledge, understanding, and wisdom provides a helpful clarification to a popular
oversimplification of the Christian apophatic tradition. There is an assumption that since
God is infinite, he cannot be fully known; thus, all intellectual inquiry of God becomes
suspect.33 However, operating under the assumption that one can increasingly become
acquainted with God over a lifetime (and perhaps beyond) undermines this assumption.
In addition, since acquaintance encompasses a complex array of desires and dispositions,
it debunks this myth by suggesting that intellectual inquiry of God is not simply a matter
of well-functioning, reliable cognitive faculties. We would be rash and incorrect to say
31. Roberts and Wood, Intellectual Virtues, 52-53. This acquaintance is a perception that is not
necessarily a sense perception, though sense perception is involved. So acquaintance is analogous to sense
perception but is not equivalent to it.
32. Roberts and Wood, Intellectual Virtues, 44.
33. I am thinking that when this phrase is used, one is referring to understanding rather than mere
knowledge. When used in daily discourse, the terms, “knowledge,” “know,” and “known,” do not possess
the distinction between knowledge and understanding that epistemologists make.
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that we cannot come to know or understand God at all simply because God is infinite.
Sometimes objects may have no limit to the quantity of depth, insight, and understanding
that acquaintance yields.34 Since knowledge by acquaintance comes in degrees, I see no
reason why one would not continue to seek a deeper acquaintance with God simply
because there is no end to what one may come to know. It seems that this very seeking is
what characterizes the spiritual and epistemic life in the first place. I take the
oversimplified statement “No one can really know God” to be an invitation for further
investigation into the spiritual depth of knowing God that is cultivated through
acquaintance. It is towards this knowledge of God that wholeheartedness aims.
Contexts
The question this thesis is concerned with initially grew out of current
conversations in virtue epistemology that reveal a strong correlation between the
formation of the self and the acquisition of knowledge. Some responsibilist virtue
epistemologists have claimed that the formation of different character traits can manifest
in one’s cognitive functions, so the traits themselves improve upon the epistemic function
of the agent.35 This means that one will more reliably acquire knowledge due to the
manifestation of these character traits in her cognitive functions. The idea is that certain

34. Roberts and Wood, Intellectual Virtues, 44.
35. Virtue epistemology has historically been comprised of two major approaches: a faculty-based
or “reliabilist” approach and a character-based or “responsibilist” approach. A virtue reliabilist, such as
Ernest Sosa, conceives of intellectual virtues as reliable or truth-conducive cognitive faculties, or
competencies, such as memory, vision, hearing, reason, and introspection (Baehr, The Inquiring Mind, 7-8).
Sosa describes the virtue reliabilist has holding more closely to the original Aristotelian list of intellectual
virtues, while virtue responsibilism correlates with Aristotle’s moral virtues and builds its account of
epistemic normativity on the subject’s responsible manifestation of character traits (Sosa, “How are Virtue
and Knowledge Related?” 62). As such, responsibilist virtue epistemologists, such as Jason Baehr,
conceive of intellectual virtues not as natural, innate cognitive faculties such as memory, reason, vision,
and introspection but as character traits manifested in cognitive functions such as inquisitiveness,
attentiveness, carefulness, and courage (Baehr, The Inquiring Mind, 89).
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traits train and attune our senses and perceptual faculties to pick up on certain realities.
Therefore, one’s perception will penetrate through a greater depth of reality. This is the
difference between the expert birdwatcher and casual hiker. Both individuals may have
propositional knowledge that a bird is sitting on that branch over there, but one has a
perceptual depth that the other lacks due to her formation as a birdwatcher and
acquaintance with the skill of birdwatching. The expert birdwatcher will be able to
distinguish that particular bird from other, similar-looking birds. My exploration of the
role wholeheartedness plays in acquiring knowledge of God by acquaintance will show
how this insight may be relevantly appropriated for themes within religious
epistemology.36
Another source of inspiration for this project comes from broader conversations in
philosophy of religion that seek to connect spiritual formation with philosophical inquiry.
Philosophers such as John Cottingham, Mark Wynn, Steve Porter, Michael McGhee,
Robert C. Roberts, William Wood, Meghan Sullivan, and James K. A. Smith have made
the case that philosophical inquiry and spiritual formation are alike in the goals to which
they aim. The work of these scholars has demonstrated that there are several branches of
philosophy germane to matters of spiritual formation and thus reveal the deeply relevant
and practical aspects of philosophical inquiry for the religious life. The relevance of the
philosophical analysis for spiritual formation becomes more obvious in the subfield of
religious epistemology, which includes treatment of how best to understand what it
means to know and experience God, approaches and conditions for a deeper

36. Fred Aquino and Paul Gavrilyuk, eds., Sensing Things Divine: Towards a Constructive
Account of Spiritual Perception (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
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understanding of God, the nature of religious faith, religious belief-formation.37 Since
understanding better what it means to know and experience God is part of this new
philosophical focus, these writers have gone so far as to reimagine these questions in
more existential terms. This is to ask not what difference religious belief makes in
evidential or epistemic terms, but what difference does it make to human life, in
existential terms?38 Therefore, I see this project as addressing, at once, theoretical and
pragmatic concerns for the Christian layperson and philosopher alike.
Finally, the argument of this thesis is largely building off the previous work of
Paul Moser, John Cottingham, and Frederick Aquino. These scholars’ work has laid the
groundwork for this thesis because they have already begun an in-depth inquiry into how
one’s spiritual formation may condition the religious realities that are perceived.
Cottingham, for example, makes the case that epistemic transformation is imperative for
inquiring about God because our interior maturation bears weight on how we perceive
reality.39 Cottingham understands saints to be those whose epistemic situation is
progressively transformed and purified so that they understand themselves, their relation
to others and to God in a new light.40 Therefore, saints’ becoming perfected in love is
best construed as a kind of shift in perception.41 Furthermore, one comes to this new level

37. Steve L. Porter, “Philosophy and Spiritual Formation: A Call to Philosophy and Spiritual
Formation,” Journal of Spiritual Formation & Soul Care 7, no. 2 (2014), 249.
38. Mark R. Wynn, Renewing the Senses: A Study of the Philosophy and Theology of the Spiritual
Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 81.
39. John Cottingham, “Saints and Saintliness,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Epistemology of
Theology, eds., William J. Abraham and Frederick D. Aquino (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 79.
40. Cottingham, “Saints and Saintliness,” 85.
41. Cottingham, “Saints and Saintliness,” 87-88.
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of perception through immersion within the spiritual practices of the church. Spiritual
practices such as prayer, fasting, and meditation have an epistemic dimension insofar as
they cultivate a receptivity to operative grace and facilitate ongoing growth in wisdom.42
Aquino also shows that deep immersion in a set of practices, materials, processes,
and people is fundamental to the formation of spiritual knowers. In his analysis of John
Cassian’s Conferences and Institutes, Aquino demonstrates that Cassian’s specific
methodology of spiritual formation reveals a complex but inextricable relationship
between the cultivation of the self and the pursuit of the relevant epistemic goods.43
Aquino’s project concludes that traits that spiritual formation cultivates are epistemic in
nature, as they play a crucial role in developing a positive orientation towards cognitive
states such as illumination, contemplation, and the vision of God.44 When it comes to
spiritual formation, what matters epistemically is the way one loves or the orientation of
one’s desires.
Aquino also seeks to read Maximus the Confessor with a focus on the role that
ascetic character traits play in the cognitive economy of the spiritual life.45 Aquino claims
that virtues contribute to the formation of a deep and abiding desire for the relevant
epistemic goods (e.g., perceptual knowledge of God).46 Christian writers such as
42. Frederick Aquino, “Spiritual Formation, Authority, and Discernment,” in Oxford Handbook of
the Epistemology of Theology, eds., William J. Abraham and Frederick D. Aquino (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2017), 159.
43. Aquino, “Spiritual Formation, Authority, and Discernment,” 168.
44. Aquino, “Spiritual Formation, Authority, and Discernment,” 164.
45. Frederick Aquino, “Maximus the Confessor,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Epistemology of
Theology, eds., William J. Abraham and Frederick D. Aquino (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017),
369.
46. Aquino, “Maximus the Confessor,” 369-70.
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Maximus have already gone to great lengths to illustrate how the formation of virtuous
dispositions is a precondition for correctly perceiving the divine. Vices bring about a state
of disintegration in which the self does not properly use its cognitive faculties and so
hinders the pursuit of the relevant epistemic goods. Consequently, any given subject is
unable to properly decipher the truth indicators of God’s presence.47 As such, Maximus
integrates virtue and knowledge in epistemological terms: “where there is ‘purification’
of the soul by the virtues, there is also ‘illumination’ by knowledge. . . . This illumination
raises up the soul to the understanding of God, and unites its desire with the ultimate
object of its desire, which is God.”48 This current literature carves out the approaches that
this thesis will then build upon and clarify just how a virtue such as wholeheartedness can
yield knowledge of God by acquaintance.
Methodology and Caveats
In the course of this thesis, I will employ some basic metaphysical assumptions
found in the thought and writings of Thomas Aquinas, such as an objective standard of
value, human flourishing as union with God, and the structure of the human will as a
hierarchy of desires. I have chosen to employ some of Aquinas’s metaphysical concepts
because these principles provide grounds for the contemporary philosophical approaches
to love, virtue, and acquaintance used in this thesis. Aquinas’s medieval worldview (i.e.,
God as the grounds for an objective standard of goodness) and his theological
anthropology (i.e., human beings are rational creatures with access to the objective good),
which prioritizes union with God as the ultimate human good, help clarify the aims

47. Aquino, “Maximus the Confessor,” 374-75.
48. Aquino, “Maximus the Confessor,” 376.
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toward which virtues such as wholeheartedness aim. This foundation is important to this
project because it prioritizes relationship with God as an axiomatic good toward which all
human life aims. Secondly, Aquinas also provides a metaphysical framework for the
connection between the formation of the self and the perception of religious realities.
Aquinas’s conception of the human person as a rational creature with a body and soul
highlights the role desires and volitional dispositions play in acquiring knowledge of God
by acquaintance.49 I also employ much of Eleonore Stump’s exegesis on Thomas
Aquinas because she carefully unpacks Aquinas’s thought on love, desire, and union. Her
work has allowed me to demonstrate exactly what union entails and the role the human
will plays in that union. Additionally, I build off Stump because she has also begun an
effort to illustrate how union with God can constitute a nondiscursive knowledge of God
and what role that knowledge may play in the life of the Christian believer.
Although I employ some metaphysical concepts, this project is not concerned
with debating the details of these metaphysical concepts. While I utilize certain insights
from Aquinas, my goal is not to exegete Aquinas, nor is it to enter any contemporary
debates about Aquinas. I employ certain aspects of Aquinas insofar as they help me
advance my claim that wholeheartedness is a constitutive intellectual virtue. Furthermore,
my goal is not to enter a discussion about the relationship between metaphysics and
epistemology. The aim of the thesis is not to demonstrate how metaphysics and
epistemology may or may not be related, but to unpack the conditions for coming to

49. It is important to note here that I do not employ or rely on any of Aquinas’s conceptions of
knowledge. I build off Aquinas’s conceptions of the human will, desire, and union. The concept of
knowledge that I will employ in this thesis is indebted to virtue epistemologists such as Roberts and Wood
rather than any medieval thinker.
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know God through acquaintance. This means that this project is a project in religious
epistemology.
Additionally, this is not to say that metaphysics is necessary for doing
epistemology. The use of Christian thinkers such as John Cassian, Maximus the
Confessor, and Thomas Aquinas only highlight how helpful their insights may be for
developing questions within religious epistemology. As such, this project makes good on
the principle of epistemic fit, where our epistemic evaluations are fit in an appropriate
way to the subject matter under investigation.50 In the case of this thesis, since the subject
matter at hand is God, the conditions by which one comes to know or understand God
will be unique and distinct. Coming to know God requires more than reliable cognitive
faculties and entails a volitional element. These conditions will not necessarily hold for
other subject matters under epistemic investigation. However, traditional epistemic rules
such as conditions for mere knowledge and knowledge as justified, true belief still hold
for the religious epistemology developed within this thesis. The project is mainly
concerned with what is entailed in becoming acquainted with God, specifically, as an
object of human inquiry.

50. William J. Abraham and Frederick D. Aquino, The Oxford Handbook of the Epistemology of
Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 1.
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CHAPTER II
THE INNER PSYCHOLOGY OF WHOLEHEARTEDNESS
Introduction
The primary task of this chapter is to describe what wholeheartedness is and what
it entails. This meticulous depiction of the trait will demonstrate the unique, internal
psychology of wholeheartedness and distinguish it from other character traits that may
appear synonymous or similar to it. Thus this chapter will mainly be concerned with the
ways in which wholeheartedness meets the second criterion for intellectual virtue. By
illustrating wholeheartedness as a firm and definite volitional integration around the
objective good, this chapter lays the ground for the second chapter, which argues that
wholeheartedness is aimed at knowledge of God by acquaintance.
Drawing upon Harry Frankfurt’s general account of love and Thomas Aquinas’
objective standard of value, I will show that wholeheartedness is a firm and definite
volitional integration around one’s ultimate flourishing or union with God. A more
detailed description of wholeheartedness will reveal three important characteristics. First,
wholeheartedness positively orients one toward epistemic goods, such as union with God
because it constitutes a volitional structure that is definite and clear. Second,
wholeheartedness also entails a trumping feature that renders its orienting capacity to be
sufficiently motivating.
The last and distinguishing feature of wholeheartedness is that it entails an
integration of one’s desires toward union with God. A wholehearted person is someone
19

who has a clear and definite volitional structure that aims at union with God. This last
feature of wholeheartedness illuminates the epistemic good to which wholeheartedness is
aimed and paves the way for the next chapter’s discussion on how wholeheartedness
yields knowledge of God by acquaintance.
An Account of Love
Baehr’s theory of intellectual virtue has provided a roadmap for determining how
different character traits can be considered intellectual virtues. Baehr maintains that each
intellectual virtue has a two-tiered psychological structure. First, the trait must be based
upon a volitional orientation toward epistemic goods, and second, the trait must have its
own unique characteristic psychology that differentiates it from other intellectual
excellences. This section will explore the unique characteristic psychology of
wholeheartedness as a way of demonstrating its status as an intellectual virtue.
Harry Frankfurt, more than any other contemporary philosopher, has gone to great
lengths to demonstrate the nature and importance of wholeheartedness for one’s practical
life. However, in order to understand what wholeheartedness is, we must first consider
the general structure of love. Frankfurt lays out four distinctive features of love that
demonstrate the fundamentally volitional character of love. The first distinctive feature of
love has to do with the object of love. When a person loves, she cares about the object of
her love not merely as a means, but as an end. As such, it is in the nature of love that the
object of love has intrinsic value.1
Second, love consists of a disinterested concern for the well-being or the good for
the beloved (or object of love). This means that the lover desires that her beloved flourish
1. Harry Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 42.
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and not be harmed. Again, this desire for the good of the beloved must be intrinsic in
order to constitute an instance of genuine love. The implication of this feature is that love
is fundamentally volitional in nature. Love has more to do with a certain configuration of
the will than with feelings of affection or attraction. This volitional configuration shapes
the dispositions of the lover with regard to what she loves and guides her in the ordering
of her relevant priorities.2 This means that if love is to persist, it depends upon the will or
volitional disposition of the lover towards the beloved rather than any characteristic
within the beloved.3
At first blush, it may seem that a disinterested desire for the good of the beloved
means that love is somehow impersonal. However, as Frankfurt points out, disinterested
does not mean impersonal; love is anything but impersonal.4 The third feature of love is
its particularity. The beloved’s importance is not generic to the lover but is particular to
the lover. For a lover, there can be no equivalent substitute for her beloved.5 Frankfurt
clarifies, “It cannot possibly be all the same to the lover whether he is devoting himself
disinterestedly to what he actually does love or—no matter how similar it might be—to
something else instead.”6

2. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 44.
3. Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2010), 96.
4. Frankfurt uses the example of someone who cares about the poor and devotes her time to their
well-being. What qualifies others to be beneficiaries of her concern is not that she loves them. This
person’s generosity is not a response to the individual identities of those whom she helps. Rather, it is
induced merely by the fact that she regards them as “poor” and in need of her help. For someone who cares
for the poor, any poor person will do (Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 43).
5. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 44.
6. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 44.
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Finally, love is not necessarily under our immediate control. For example, a
person may discover that she cannot affect whether or how much she cares about a
certain person or thing merely by her own direct and immediate decision.7 Frankfurt has
in mind those instances where one cannot help but care about staying alive, about
remaining physically intact, about not being radically isolated, etc. In matters such as
these, a person is subject to a necessity that forcefully constrains the will and that she
cannot elude merely by choosing or deciding to do so.8 Therefore, love consists of a
volitional necessity, which consists essentially of a constraint of the will.9 In other words,
our prime facia desires are not entirely up to us. One does not suddenly decide that she
cares about staying alive, nor does she care about staying alive one day only to wake up
the next morning and suddenly not care about staying alive.
Frankfurt further explains the nature of this necessity by claiming that the restraint
upon the will does not originate in any external source but within a person’s own will.
This is why someone who is bound by volitional necessity is unable to form a determined
and effective intention to perform or to refrain from performing the action that is at issue
simply because he loves what he loves and does not love what he does not love.
Furthermore, this means that love comes in degrees. A person will love some things more
than other things, so the necessity that love imposes on the will is rarely absolute. As
such, the interaction between the will and action becomes a little more complex given
7. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 44. However, Frankfurt does concede that under certain
circumstances it is possible for a person to decide whether or not she loves or how much she cares. It is
possible at times for a person to bring it about that she cares about something or that she does not care
about it, simply by making up her mind about it.
8. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 44-45.
9. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 46.
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certain circumstances. For example, we cannot say that a person who sacrifices her life to
protect her country from catastrophic harm does not love living. Nor does her sacrifice
demonstrate that she wholly accepted and willed that she die. This simply reflects the
particular ordering of one’s priorities in a given situation.10
As such, love is vulnerable to disruption. Alternatives are always conceivable, so
it is possible for a person to imagine herself loving things other than those she does
indeed love and to wonder if it is preferable to love an alternative. One’s volitional
structure or psychic integrity can be ruptured by unresolved conflicts among the various
things that she loves. Conflicts such as these undermine the unity of the will and puts a
person at odds with herself. It is possible that the necessities that certain loves place upon
the will are incompatible and thus it makes it impossible for one to plot a volitional
course.11 As such, if one’s love of one thing clashes with her love of another, she may
well be unable to accept herself as she is. What makes it psychologically relevant is that
one disposition is ruling out another.
Ultimately, this means that a person’s ability to love rests upon the confidence she
has in her own volitional character. A person’s readiness to be satisfied with loving what
she actually loves does not depend upon evidence, arguments, or one’s cognitive
faculties. What ensures that a person accepts her love without equivocation, and what
thereby secures the stability of one’s final ends, is that she has confidence in her own
volitional character. This is to say that the configuration of one’s will—the ordering of
her priorities and loves—is what expresses and defines exactly who this individual is. As

10. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 47.
11. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 50.

23

such, a person identifies herself with what she loves. The configuration of one’s will
defines the shape of her practical life and what she is willing or not willing to do.
Furthermore, it determines what she may or may not be willing to accept as a reason for
acting or not acting. So any anxiety or uneasiness that she experiences on account of
recognizing what she is constrained to love goes to the heart of her attitude toward her
own character as a person. Any sort of disturbance a person experiences with regard to
what she loves, then, is symptomatic of a lack of confidence in who she is as a person.12
A consequence of these features is that what counts as normative for love does not
lie in the transient incitements of human emotion or the universality of logic. Rather,
normativity for love lies in the contingent necessities of love. The necessities of love
express something that belongs to the most intimate and most fundamental nature of an
individual. We also recall that these necessities are not impersonal but are embedded
within the structures of the will through which or with which the specific identity of the
individual is defined or identified.
Wholeheartedness
What is important about wholeheartedness is the fulsome manner in which we
love our “true self.” 13 A human being’s true self is to be identified with those desires that
reflect what she judges to be ultimately good for her. Therefore, a person’s wholehearted
love of her true self fulfills the conditions of love by protecting and advancing what she
takes to be that which truly promotes her own flourishing or well-being. In this way

12. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 50.
13. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 77-78.
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wholeheartedness adheres more closely to the four criteria of love and more accurately
gets at the heart of what love essentially is.
Initially, it is clear that wholeheartedness conforms to the third feature of love.
For example, when a person loves herself, the identification of the lover with her beloved
is distinctively robust and unambiguous. For a person who loves herself, her own
interests and those of her beloved are identical. It is also obvious that a person who loves
herself is devoted to her beloved as a particular individual rather than an instance of an
archetype. In other words, there really is not a conceivable substitute for the self. This
wholehearted love toward the true self is also not outside our immediate voluntary
control. Frankfurt believes that we are more naturally moved to love ourselves than
anything external to ourselves. This leads to the last feature of love: in wholeheartedness,
a person is dedicated to a greater degree to the flourishing of the beloved for its own
sake.14 As such, wholeheartedness is entirely disinterested, in the sense of being
motivated by no interests other than those of the beloved.15
An initial objection to this understanding of wholeheartedness is that it
necessarily collapses into nothing more than a love of things one loves. However, the
situation is less straightforward than that. The case can be made that a person may, in
fact, love herself even though she does not love anything else. For example, a person
could simply be ignorant of what she loves, or she could truly not have found anything or
anyone to love. For her to love herself, then, she simply needs to make a determined
effort to discover or understand what truly is important to her. It is by this determined

14. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 81-82.
15. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 82.
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effort to become clear about what a person loves and thus plot a volitional course that one
identifies with, she demonstrates wholeheartedness. Being concerned for the true interests
of the beloved could simply mean that the lover is moved by an elementary desire to
identify what those interests are and to identify them correctly.16 Furthermore, a person
can also demonstrate wholeheartedness by overcoming any conflict within her volitional
structure that would impair her capacity to love in a strenuous sense. In other words,
wholeheartedness consists of a person’s desire to have final ends that she can accept as
her own and to which she is dedicated for their own sakes.17
Another possible objection to this conception of wholeheartedness is that it is
impossible for one person to constitute both the lover and the beloved. If we take
individuals to be single metaphysical realities, how can we begin to separate out the lover
and beloved within the self? This seems self-defeating. Yet as hinted at above, it is
possible for a person to be divided within her own volitional structure. A person can
possess contradicting desires that divide the self, so a person can be at odds with herself
regarding which desires she should identify with. Since humans are rational creatures
with reflexive capabilities, a person can desire to have a certain will or volitional
structure other than what she has. So a person can identify with certain desires she has
while, at the same time, possess desires with which she does not fully identify or want to
identify.

16. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 88.
17. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 9.
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The Characteristic Psychology of Wholeheartedness
Current objections aside, we have a sufficient description of wholeheartedness to
determine the unique, internal psychology of it. The wholehearted person is wholly
settled as to what she wants and what she cares about. She has no doubts or reservations
as to where she stands regarding any conflict of desires or inclinations within herself.
One who is wholeheartedly committed to an epistemic good, such as acquaintance with
God, has decided that this is indeed what she aims at. This means that being
wholehearted is a matter of personally identifying with what one desires in such a way
that it becomes a trumping desire and allows one to function epistemically well. She can
pursue the epistemic goods toward which she aims without conflict or hindrance. This is
to say that wholeheartedness consists of a clear and unified volitional structure that
contributes to one’s personal intellectual worth by positively orienting her toward the
epistemic goods she identifies as the desires of her true self. By being wholeheartedly
integrated around an epistemic good such as acquaintance with God, she would then be to
be considered to have a deep and abiding desire for knowledge of God by acquaintance.
Otherwise, a person who is indeterminate or unsure about her volitional course
will not be able to function epistemically well due to the degree of conflict within her.
For example, someone who believes herself to love or desire a first-hand knowledge of
God but at the same time does not want to be close to God will be at odds with herself.
This person would not be admired with regard to her personal excellence given that she is
divided against herself. This person will not have the volitional disposition for possessing
a deep and abiding desire that would contribute to her personal intellectual worth. Her
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reluctance to do what it takes to come to know God may at times trump that of her desire
for knowledge of God by acquaintance and render her, in a sense, epistemically vicious.
The first defining feature of wholeheartedness is a volitional structure that is
definite, firm, unreserved, and unified. This first feature entails the second unique
characteristic of wholeheartedness as being sufficiently motivating. A person who
wholeheartedly loves epistemic goods can be said to be positively oriented towards them
to a degree that is strong enough to be motivating. In fact, wholeheartedness constitutes
that very strength of motivation. We would be able to admire a person who is
wholeheartedly committed to acquaintance with God so that it proves consistently
motivating for her. This strong motivating feature of wholeheartedness puts one at an
epistemic advantage when she is confronted with hostile deterrents to her commitment to
such epistemic goods.18 Once wholeheartedness is established, then it can produce further
confidence in one’s volitional character. When one’s volitional character is questioned,
she will be able to defeat such doubts in and through her wholehearted love of epistemic
goods. Wholeheartedness constrains her volitional structure so that she is compelled to
remain persistent in her commitment and pursuit of epistemic goods. This volitional
aspect of wholeheartedness is what makes it unique as an intellectual virtue and is what
separates it from other virtues such as intellectual courage and firmness.19

18. I take these deterrents to encompass both internal and external actors. For example, a
competing first-order desire in one’s own volitional structure can pose a threat to one’s second-order desire
for an epistemic good. Perhaps more controversially, an external threat to one’s wholehearted pursuit of
epistemic goods could include instances of epistemic injustice. For example, minority groups who are not
represented in the authoritative structures of a community’s epistemic economy may be deterred from a
wholehearted pursuit of relevant epistemic goods. Since these groups are not respected or seen as epistemic
authorities, there may be no sufficiently motivating desire cultivated within these groups for further pursuit
of epistemic goods.
19. Robert Roberts and Jay Wood discuss extensively the trait of firmness. While their account of
firmness and my account of wholeheartedness are similar, the trait of wholeheartedness is distinct from
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Yet there remains a massive lacuna in our account of wholeheartedness as an
intellectual virtue. First, the given definition of wholeheartedness does not seem to give
us much of a basis on which a person would love epistemic goods rather than epistemic
vices. That wholeheartedness would necessarily lead one to love what is intellectually
“good” rather than “bad” is imperative to establishing it as an intellectual virtue.
Otherwise, wholeheartedness would appear neutral concerning one’s orientation toward
the good. If a person could be wholeheartedly committed to what is vicious, then it is not
clear as to how wholeheartedness on its own could contribute to one’s personal
intellectual worth. Even Frankfurt claims that “Being wholehearted is quite compatible
not only with being morally somewhat imperfect but even with being dreadfully and
irredeemably wicked.”20
In order to consider wholeheartedness as an intellectual virtue, then, it must have
value content. If a trait is an intellectual virtue insofar as it positively orients one toward
epistemic goods, then wholeheartedness cannot remain neutral. So this current account of
wholeheartedness needs to be supplemented. Eleonore Stump’s exegesis of Thomas
Aquinas’s conception of the desires of love, the philosophy of personal identification, and
integration of the will shall provide further clarification to our account of
wholeheartedness. Stump’s unpacking of Aquinas’s thought on union will help illustrate
that a will can only be whole or integrated around the objective good. This illustration

firmness in that it describes one’s volitional structure, not her epistemic life in general. I understand
wholeheartedness to be foundational to firmness and as an expansion upon Roberts’ and Wood’s account.
Roberts and Wood focus on the role firmness plays in one’s epistemic life while I focus on the volitional
aspect or required structure of one’s will for an optimal epistemic life. It is in this way that
wholeheartedness is foundational to and antecedent of intellectual firmness.
20. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 98.
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will then fill out my definition of wholeheartedness so that it fits within our framework
for intellectual virtue.
Wholeheartedness and the Objective Good
Much like Frankfurt, Aquinas believes that one of the two foundational desires of
love is a desire for the good of the beloved. It bears a striking resemblance to Frankfurt’s
first feature of love where one must have a disinterested concern for the well-being or
flourishing of the beloved. However, where Frankfurt is light on his metaphysical
definition of “flourishing,” Aquinas is less so. To desire the good of the beloved is to
desire for the beloved those things that actually contribute to the beloved’s flourishing.
This “good” desired by the lover is to be understood in the broader sense of “good,”
which encompasses metaphysical as well as moral goodness. It seems that for Frankfurt,
if we ask the lover, “why do you love the beloved?” the answer may justifiably be, “I just
do; it’s a final end for me. It gives my life meaning.” For Aquinas, the answer to the
question, “why do you love the beloved,” ought to be, “because it’s good.” This is
because it is good that the beloved should have what is good for him.21 So love
necessarily entails a desire for the objective good of the beloved.
Since Aquinas holds that there is an objective standard of goodness, the measure
of value for the goodness at issue in the first desire of love is also objective. This means
that the good of the beloved must be understood as that which truly leads to the ultimate
good or flourishing of the beloved.22 This ultimate good or flourishing entails union with
God. The “good” for the beloved will be those things that bring the beloved closer to

21. Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 93.
22. Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 93.
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God. The reason for this is due to the classical attributes of divine nature, where God is,
in a sense, ultimate goodness, or at the very least, is the grounds for this goodness.23 The
strong connection between God and goodness means that anything that contributes to the
objective good or flourishing of a human person also brings her closer to God.24
Aquinas’s conception of the first desire of love carries implications for
wholeheartedness. If wholeheartedness entails love of the true self, then the lover must
desire what is ultimately good for the beloved. This means that for one to love herself,
she must desire her own ultimate flourishing, or union with God. For this reason it does
not appear possible for a person who is wholeheartedly committed to any evil or vice to
actually be so. A person who is committed to evil even in her first-order desires will
invariably be divided. Thus a person cannot be arbitrarily wholehearted but necessarily
wholehearted toward objective goodness. A case of the sort endorsed by Frankfurt, where
a person is internally integrated wholly around evil, would not be possible.
One’s desires can be integrated only by bringing one’s first-order desires into
harmony with her second-order desires. A person’s first-order desires reflect her reasons
relating to the goodness of some particular action in some particular circumstance.
However, a person’s second-order desires relate to the kind of volitional structure, or
will, she wants to have. Second-order desires reflect a person’s all-things-considered
reasons about what would be good in general to do in circumstances generally of this sort

23. I do not wish to enter any contentious debate concerning divine attributes or the doctrine of
divine simplicity. I am merely presupposing a classical conception of divine nature.
24. Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 94.
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and these desires are correlated with her all-things-considered determination about the
sort of will it is good for her to have.25
In the psychological sense, a human being’s true self is to be identified with her
second-order desires because they reflect the all-things-considered judgment of her
rational faculties, and these rational faculties are constitutive of what she is in the
metaphysical sense.26 An individual is to be identified with her second-order desires
because they entail the determination of her entire intellect in a way that her first-order
desires do not. When a person is divided against herself, her true self is to be identified
with her second-order desires because that part of her divided psyche reflects most the
considered determinations of her own intellect. 27 For these reasons when a person’s firstorder desires conflict with her second-order desires, she can unify them by bringing her
first-order desires into harmony with her second-order desires. A person will not be able
to integrate her desires by bringing her second-order desires in harmony with her firstorder desires for a certain evil. She will always have second-order desires not to have
certain first-order desires in virtue of the fact that her intellect repudiates them as not
good.28
25. Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 134.
26. Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 133. A person is an individual substance of a rational nature,
where rational nature is comprised of both intellect and will. No matter what internal divisions there may
be in a person’s psyche, if those divisions do not render the person mentally nonfunctional, she is still just
one person, metaphysically speaking. She is one agent and one “self.”
27. Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 134.
28. Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 138-39. Furthermore, Aquinas thinks that the moral order is
so accessible to ordinary reason that no normally functioning human intellect is ever totally ignorant of it.
For Aquinas, no one ever gets so evil that there is nothing in the intellect or will that holds back from the
evil she is immersed in or that desires something better. Therefore, a person who takes to be good
something that is objectively evil will always be double-minded and this duplicity within her reason will
correspond with a division in her will. Since a person will always identify somewhat with the objective
good, no one can be said to love wholeheartedly what is evil.
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Thus the third defining feature of wholeheartedness is a unified volitional
structure in which one’s desires are integrated around the objective good as union with
God. The desires of a wholehearted person are ordered toward this end and integrated
around the good that is objective for her. This desire for union is authoritative to her in
the sense that she has identified it as her ultimate aim or ends. In this way
wholeheartedness gets at the core of what it means to love one’s true self.
Furthermore, this unique characteristic of wholeheartedness reveals the epistemic
good to which wholeheartedness aims. If wholeheartedness necessarily integrates one
around union with God, then one is essentially aiming toward an acquaintance with God.
Consequently, this acquaintance with God yields a first-hand knowledge of God.
Therefore, the unique psychology of wholeheartedness reveals that wholeheartedness
aims at knowledge of God by acquaintance. This aspect of the argument will be taken up
in the next chapter.
Conclusion
By positively orienting one toward knowledge of God by acquaintance in a
sufficiently motivating way, wholeheartedness constitutes an intellectual virtue. If
wholeheartedness is a matter of being confident about one’s volitional structure and being
confident about one’s volitional structure places one in a position in which they are
fulfilling all four criteria of love, then wholeheartedness is also a matter of loving the
self. This means that a wholehearted person has a particular volitional structure that is
definite and unified. Since wholeheartedness constitutes a firm and resolute volitional
structure with a confident volitional course, then a wholehearted person is positively
oriented toward her desires in a sufficiently motivating way. This means that a
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wholehearted person is able to overcome any doubt of ambivalence that may pose a threat
to the wholehearted unity of her desires. A wholehearted person will function
epistemically better than a divided or ambivalent person. A wholehearted person will
remain resolute and sufficiently motivated in her volitional course.
Not only does wholeheartedness describe the unity of a person’s volitional
structure, but also the direction of one’s volitional course. One can only be
wholeheartedly integrated around the objective good, where an individual’s objective
good constitutes union with God because God is goodness itself. Therefore,
wholeheartedness, more specifically, describes a person whose desires are integrated
around union with God. Wholeheartedness is paramount to one’s closeness and
experience of God, or first-hand knowledge of God. As such, wholeheartedness carries
great implications for one’s capacity for religious experience and knowledge of God by
acquaintance. It is to this discussion that we shall turn in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER III
WHOLEHEARTEDNESS AND KNOWLEDGE OF GOD BY ACQUAINTANCE
Introduction
In this chapter, I will demonstrate that wholeheartedness is a constitutive
intellectual virtue. Wholeheartedness not only aims at knowledge of God by
acquaintance, but wholeheartedness actually constitutes one’s acquaintance with God.1 In
order to advance this claim, I will first illustrate the relationship between union with God
and knowledge by acquaintance. I demonstrate that union is an acquaintance with God
that yields a knowledge of God for oneself. This union entails a shared attention and
closeness with God that requires a wholehearted desire for union with God. Second, I
clarify how this union and shared attention is an instance of acquaintance by likening
coming to know God as coming to know another person. By characterizing knowledge of
God as analogous to knowledge of persons, one can better see how this union constitutes
acquaintance with God.
The third section will expound upon the previous two by demonstrating how
becoming wholehearted constitutes acquaintance with God. If shared attention is an
instance of knowing God and shared attention requires wholeheartedness, then one must
be wholehearted in order to be acquainted with God. However, most human wills are
divided by conflicts of desires and must move toward integration. This process of
1. This account of wholeheartedness does not encompass a comprehensive and exhaustive theory
of acquaintance with God but merely showcases that becoming wholehearted is an instance of acquaintance
with God.
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becoming wholehearted is assisted by God’s cooperative grace, and it is through this that
one becomes acquainted with God. The last section will take up the knowledgeconstitutive nature of this process by demonstrating just how becoming wholehearted
constitutes knowledge of God by acquaintance. This section will demonstrate that
wholeheartedness is an epistemic contributor, which is to say that it is knowledge
constitutive. As such, I will illustrate that it is in and through one’s wholeheartedness that
she comes to know God by acquaintance. This ultimately supports the claim that
wholeheartedness is a constitutive intellectual virtue.
Union with God and Knowledge by Acquaintance (KA)
If wholeheartedness is a matter of being integrated around the objective good and
the objective good for every human person is union with God, then wholeheartedness
aims at union with God. At first blush, there does not seem to be anything epistemic
about union with God. This objection begs the question: how can wholeheartedness be
considered an intellectual virtue if it is not clear that wholeheartedness aims at any
epistemic good? I propose that union with God, however, yields knowledge of God by
acquaintance. This is because the conditions that constitute union are instances of the
acquaintance described by Roberts and Wood. Acquaintance encompasses a knowledgefor-oneself, where one’s own personal experiences of the object of knowledge contribute
to the depth and richness of one’s perception of the object.2 In union with another agent,

2. Acquaintance encompasses a knowledge-for-oneself, which adds qualia to one’s beliefformation process. Acquaintance communicates that perception, understanding, and wisdom may deepen
through the immediacy of experience. It is also the case that while immediate experience of an object of
knowledge may yield new beliefs or improve warrants for current beliefs, it also broadens and enriches
one’s own perspective. So the knowledge-for-oneself involved in acquaintance is unique insofar as the
experience and perception of an object of knowledge cannot be transferred onto another.
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one becomes perceptually aware of that agent in a way that another person outside of this
union will not be.
In this section, I will demonstrate that union with God yields a knowledge of God
by acquaintance. The significant personal presence and closeness that is entailed within
union with God constitutes an acquaintance with God, which produces a knowledge-foroneself of God. A brief description of the conditions entailed within union will also
reveal the role wholeheartedness plays in union with God. Therefore, I will conclude by
demonstrating that wholeheartedness is required for union with God. In order to illustrate
the relationship between union with God and knowledge by acquaintance, I will rely on
and build upon the account of love, desire, and union developed through Eleonore
Stump’s reading of Aquinas.3
The sort of union a wholehearted person would be concerned with requires two
things: personal presence and mutual closeness.4 The relationship between presence and
closeness encompasses both minimal and significant personal presence. Minimal personal
presence is understood as a generic connection between persons. For example, “the
doctor himself was present and available to her only in the early morning.”5 In contrast,
significant personal presence requires that one also be close to another person and not

3. I want to reiterate that I am not trying to exegete the writings of Thomas Aquinas, nor am I
trying to establish a comprehensive historical account of what Thomas Aquinas thought about love, desire,
and union. I am simply employing Stump’s work because she also brings some of Aquinas’s important
distinctions within concepts such as love, desire, and union into a conversation about nondiscursive
knowledge of God.
4. Furthermore, Stump claims that Aquinas uses the concept of union quite extensively but that he
does not offer a philosophical treatment of it. As such, the philosophical account of union provided is one
of Stump’s own making, but one that she draws out from her reading of Aquinas and the medieval world
view she ascribes to him.
5. Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 110.
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simply “present” to her. These conditions also hold when the other subject of union is
God.6
For our purposes, we need only to focus on what significant personal presence
entails. For significant personal presence to obtain, there needs to be an experience of
shared attention, or dyadic shared attention. Shared attention is a second-person
experience where a person shares awareness of the sharing of focus or attention on
another subject.7 The object of awareness in shared attention between two subjects is
simultaneously the other person and their mutual awareness of one another. It is a kind of
naked attention. For example, joint attention between two friends, Sarah and Chance, is
where Sarah is both aware of Chance and Chance’s awareness of her and vice versa.8
Furthermore, it is not enough for a person to merely be aware of another person and
attentive to him, where this attentiveness is a direct and unmediated cognitive contact.9
The shared attention in significant personal presence must be mutual.10
This shared attention between a person and God within union constitutes a kind of
acquaintance. Once this shared attention has an established pattern over time, it will yield
an experiential knowledge of God’s presence and actions within one’s life through those
interactions. The knowledge by acquaintance produced by union is much like the
knowledge one gains of her spouse or a close relative. Over time, one begins to pick up

6. Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 111. It is for this reason we can affirm the claim that God is
present to everyone everywhere, while at the same time, affirming the claim that God is hidden.
7. Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 112-16.
8. Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 116.
9. Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 117.
10. This is what distinguishes minimal personal presence and significant personal presence.
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on and recognize the tiny idiosyncrasies of her partner: what he likes or does not like,
what irritates him, or what calms him. However, this knowledge by acquaintance is not
exhausted by a list of another agent’s likes or dislikes. The agents in an intimate union
will also be able to anticipate the decisions, thoughts, or feelings of one another. In this
way one’s perception is deepened by acquaintance.
For example, I can describe my mother’s likes and dislikes so that a second-hand
knowledge of my mother may be obtained. However, I would be much harder pressed to
transfer knowledge by acquaintance of my mother’s love for me to another agent.
Another person simply cannot possess that acquaintance in the same way that I do. For
another person to have a first-hand knowledge of the love of my mother, he must enter a
union with her because this knowledge can be transferred only through a first-hand
experience yielded by an acquaintance with my mother. Therefore, significant personal
presence is not merely an unmediated, non-doxastic, cognitive contact. It is more aptly
described by the established patterns of recognition, belief formation, and understanding
carried via memory and other faculties that constitute acquaintance. In this way union
with God constitutes an acquaintance with God that yields an experiential knowledge of
God.
Secondly, we must consider what it means for one person to be close to another.
A certain level of self-revelation is needed for the closeness of union. For example, Sarah
is close to Chance only if Chance shares thoughts and feelings that are revelatory of
Chance and of which Chance himself deeply cares. Chance would not be close to Sarah if
he shared only his most trivial thoughts but nothing of what was important to or revealing
of him. So it is that Sarah’s closeness to Chance requires self-revelation on the part of
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Chance, not Sarah. This means that Chance must be actively engaged in self-revelation.
Chance’s choosing to reveal his thoughts and feelings is necessary for Sarah’s closeness
to him. Furthermore, Sarah must receive Chance’s self-revelation in the sense that she
can comprehend what he is trying to reveal to her.11 In an analogous sense, for God to be
close to a person, she must choose to reveal the thoughts and feelings that are most
important to her and that are self-revelatory of her to God.
There is also a sense in which need or vulnerability is also required for closeness.
One person can need another person in the sense that the need is simply to fulfill the
desire for that person.12 When Augustine says to God, “You have made us for yourself,
and our hearts are restless until they rest in you,” he is expressing the sort of need
necessary for closeness and thus union.13 Augustine’s needing God in this sense, then, is
a matter of God’s fulfilling Augustine’s desire for God. In other words, Augustine needs
to have God, given his desire for God. If he had no need for God, he would not care
whether he had God in his life or not. As such, it would be counter-intuitive to say that
God is close to Augustine if Augustine had no need for God. Furthermore, insofar as the
fulfillment of Augustine’s desire for God is at least in part dependent upon God rather
than Augustine, Augustine’s having a need for God makes him vulnerable to God. This
vulnerability is also requisite for closeness. Closeness must include one person desiring
in another person those volitional states that are necessary for her being close, that is, her
11. Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 120. By “comprehend,” it is meant that Chance, even in his
self-revelation, is not entirely enigmatic to Sarah. For example, he does not reveal himself in a language
that Sarah does not speak.
12. Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 122.
13. Saint Augustine, the Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2009), 3.
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comprehending of the other person’s self-revelation to her and her willingness to have
him need her and reveal his mind to her.14
This analogy, for the purposes of this project, is to illustrate the reciprocity and
mutuality that is entailed within union. Union is not unilateral. The point is that God
cannot be close to a human person if that human person does not meet the conditions for
closeness or significant personal presence. This analogy is also pointed toward human
beings, so when the analogy is directed towards God, it begins to break down. Since God
is always present to human beings and wholly perfect, God already meets the conditions
for union. Furthermore, God already knows the hearts of human beings, so what is it that
human beings reveal to God that God does not already know? Again, human beings must
be volitionally open to God through their vulnerability and self-revelation. It matters that
a person chooses to do these things for union with God, even though God is not
necessarily receiving any new knowledge. God cannot have what God wants in union
unless the object of his desire (creation) also meets the conditions for union.15
What we can draw from this characterization of union is that its success is
dependent upon the state of one’s will. For union and closeness to obtain, it is not enough
for either the beloved or lover to have certain desires. Rather, these desires must be
prioritized within the hierarchy of the will in such a way that both the lover and the

14. Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 122-23.
15. The primary focus on the analogies I draw between union with and knowledge of another
person is the state of the human will with regard to acquiring knowledge of God by acquaintance. I am not
concerned with the nature and state of God’s will. I do not intend to debate the relationship between the
metaphysics of God’s reality and epistemology. The epistemic dimension of wholeheartedness is a purely
human one and does not necessarily translate over to that of God’s knowledge. Again, the focus of this
thesis is to enumerate the conditions by which a human being comes to know God by acquaintance and not
the inverse. If these conditions are met, then one can come to know God by acquaintance even though God
is metaphysically different.
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beloved may have what it is they want in love. In other words, one must possess the
second-order desire to have the will that is attentive, self-revelatory, and vulnerable. One
cannot simply desire that another be close to her; she must also desire all of which is
required for closeness, such as significant personal presence, self-revelation, and
vulnerability. For a person to be close to God then, it is necessary for her to will her
attentiveness to God, her own self-revelation to God, and her vulnerability to God.
However, these are strenuous conditions for union with God and can be quite
difficult to achieve. Human beings do not typically desire an open vulnerability and selfrevelation to a perfectly moral, omnipotent being. Any inquiry into a knowledge of God
for oneself will be cut through with an array of complex volitional attitudes and
dispositions. If one is to be unified with God, then the hierarchy of her desires must
prioritize the attentiveness, self-revelation, and vulnerability needed in significant
personal presence and closeness. Yet, the human will can be broken or divided by
conflicting desires or by vices such as pride, envy, and sloth. The divided will can inhibit
a person from achieving union with God, and thus, the knowledge of God yielded by this
acquaintance. This is because a person who desires to be vulnerable to God but at the
same time is prideful or believes that she does not need God, will not achieve union with
God to a degree that would establish a strong pattern of acquaintance. 16 This person will
be unable to recognize or perceive the actions of God in her life or how God might relate
to her. 17 In this way wholeheartedness, as an intellectual virtue, brings one to union with
God.

16. Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 124.
17. Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 125.
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A wholehearted person will have an unreserved, unequivocal volitional course
aimed at union with God. The wholehearted person will not have the divided will that
alienates her from God. As one becomes more wholehearted and integrated around the
objective good of union with God, she will be able to overcome any divisions or conflicts
within her will. The healing of her volitional structure will bring her to a wholehearted
course toward union with God. Therefore, a person who is wholehearted becomes
progressively acquainted with God and gains an epistemic advantage regarding
understanding, perception, and recognition of God through this intimate union.
Shared Attention as Religious Experience
If this union is an acquaintance and acquaintance yields a knowledge that is a
deepening of one’s perception and awareness of God, then union with God constitutes
this knowledge of God.18 This is to say that one does not become unified with God and
then only subsequently comes to know God by acquaintance. It is in and through this
union that one comes to know God. For instance, it is through being my mother’s
daughter that I come to a knowledge by acquaintance of her and her love for me. As such,
knowing God is much like coming to know another person, where one’s relationship
constitutes one’s acquaintance. Drawing an analogy between knowledge of God by
acquaintance and knowledge of persons helps clarify the epistemic advantage one gains
through experience of God and how this experience constitutes knowledge of God by
acquaintance.

18. I want to reiterate that this knowledge of God by acquaintance is primarily non-propositional
but acquaintance with God does not rule out the possibility that one could come by propositional
knowledge of God through acquaintance.
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In the Christian tradition, this union with and knowledge of God has been
characterized as mystical or religious experience. In contemporary epistemology,
philosophers have traditionally characterized this religious experience of God as
analogous to sensory perception of a material object.19 However, epistemologists such as
Adam Green have demonstrated that the perception involved in religious experience is
more likened to acquaintance, which is to say that religious experience is less like seeing
an apple and more like experiencing a person.20 Although knowledge of persons does
involve sensory perception, the perception that acquaintance involves is a rich and robust
recognition and awareness of the inner world of the agent one is acquainted with. For
example, after years of being acquainted with my mother, I will be able to recognize
whether my mother has been in a room because of little clues she leaves behind. Say that
my experience of my mother tells me that she is easily irritated by clutter and I return to a
tidy room that was once messy. I will recognize my mother’s “mark” on the room and
perceive her presence there.21

19. William P. Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University, 1991).
20. Adam Green, “Hiddenness and the Epistemology of Attachment,” in Hidden Divinity and
Religious Belief: New Perspectives, eds., Eleonore Stump and Adam Green (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2015), 143. Other epistemologists, such as Paul Moser, make a similar point. Sarah
Coakley also critiques and expands upon Alston’s understanding of religious experience, although I would
argue that her religious epistemology makes the “apophatic turn,” while I am trying to find more of a
middle ground within epistemology by building upon Roberts and Wood’s concept of knowledge of
acquaintance.
21. Another pertinent example that illustrates this principle is that of spiritual direction. It is the
primary task of the spiritual director to help one better perceive the movements, actions, and presence of
God in her day-to-day experience. In order to do this, the spiritual director must have a greater depth of
acquaintance with God and thus a broader and richer perception of God. The spiritual director will have
more experience in being able to recognize God and better able to determine whether a judgment, intuition,
or event actually constitutes God’s presence. In this way, a spiritual director would recognize God’s mark
on the life of another and perceive God’s presence in her life.
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As such, what one perceives of another person depends on the level or depth of
interaction between the two subjects. As the interaction and shared attention between two
subjects deepen, their perception of each other deepens as well. Therefore, there are
levels of shared attention that correspond to degrees of acquaintance. The first level of
shared attention occurs when one person is engaged in an act of attending to something
and, in doing so, is coordinating with another on what both are attending to. In dyadic
shared attention, the something that each party is attending to is each other. This kind of
shared attention would be recognized by two lovers gazing into one another’s eyes. In
triadic shared attention, the center of attention is something other than each person’s
attention, but the feel of the experience includes its jointness. This experience would
include something such as two people enjoying a concert of their favorite band or
participating in a worship service of a faith tradition in which they are both believers.22
These types of shared attention also interact with one another in such a way that
shared attention becomes a diachronic process. In dyadic shared attention, the experience
of one another gets taken up into the triadic experience, coloring the background of the
experience and transforming what would otherwise be a private experience into a
relational one. This progressive shared attention has the capacity to deepen or widen
one’s perception of other objects and persons. The triadic process is one of making a
connection with another person and then having the point of that connection widen more
and more until one is able to experience the wider world together.23 It is this level of
shared attention that we would ascribe to a holy person, such as a saint. A saint who has

22. Green, “Hiddenness,” 143.
23. Green, “Hiddenness,” 143.
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experienced shared attention with God at this level would have such an epistemic
transformation that she would be able to perceive the wider world around her in
conjunction with God.24 In this case, the saint would have an epistemic advantage not
only when it comes to knowledge of God but also when it comes to knowledge of God’s
actions in the world. It is in and through the saint’s acquaintance with God that she is
better able to perceive the nature and aim of God’s will for creation.
These different levels of shared attention provide a framework for better
understanding the gradation of acquaintance with God that one may experience. Firstlevel religious experience of the divine would be much like an infant picking out persons
as objects in her environment. Second-level religious experience involves building a
sense of how to think about what this divine person is doing. This is analogous to when
an infant shifts her perception of a person from that of an object to that of an agent. She
understands that the person within her perception is a “doer” rather than a passive
object.25
In the third level, God’s presence is communicated, but the experience of that
communication is shallow. This level of experience is more vulnerable to alternative
interpretations or doubts. However, once this interaction is secured, perception of God
will track a history of interaction. As such, the fourth level of religious experience
involves sharing attention with God on objects of local interest to the human person.26

24. Cottingham, “Saints and Saintliness,” 79-88. It is this level or kind of shared attention that I
believe John Cottingham describes in his discussion of saints as being epistemic exemplars, whose
perception of the world has been transformed.
25. Green, “Hiddenness,” 145.
26. Green, “Hiddenness,” 145.
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These two levels of religious experience would constitute one’s progressive union with
God. In the fourth level of religious experience, the hierarchy of one’s desires becomes
the center of focus for both the individual and God. In this instance, both God and the
individual wills the will that desires union. The person in the fourth level of religious
experience is progressively becoming wholeheartedly integrated around union with God
and becoming acquainted with God through that process.
Finally, the fifth level of religious experience corresponds with triadic shared
attention. This is when a person moves beyond a focus on only objects tied to her narrow
interests of herself to encompass items of wider concern to herself and God. Thus the
deepest level of religious experience is a kind of shared attention that takes up a history
of interaction into the meaning and affect conveyed between oneself and God.27 This
would describe John Cottingham’s saint who not only knows that one of the greatest
commands is to love one’s neighbor as oneself, but can appreciate and understand the
grounds for that claim.28 The person in the fifth level of religious experience is
wholehearted, meaning that she has the volitional structure that prioritizes presence and
closeness with God and has obtained union with God as a result of that
wholeheartedness.29

27. Green, “Hiddenness,” 145-46.
28. Cottingham, “Saints and Saintliness,” 88.
29. The main point of distinction between my project and the thinkers I am indebted to is that I do
believe that we begin the process of unification with God in this life. Moreover, this process is continuous
and progressive so that it will be completed in the afterlife. If this unification process begins in this life,
then human beings do obtain knowledge of God by acquaintance in the here and now. My thought is more
constructive in that I am claiming that this acquaintance can be experienced now, to some degree, and not
only in the eschaton. Therefore, this aspect of my thesis is not deliberately representative of thinkers such
as Thomas Aquinas and Maximus the Confessor. I am more in debt to the analytic concept of acquaintance
here.
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Since the levels of religious experience are built upon one another, then the
special qualitative features of the fifth level are not entirely independent from the
everyday patterns present at the very first level. This means that there is no a priori
reason to suppose that the realm of common experience and ecstatic, mystical experience
are widely separated. The experience of coming to know God can be as common as
coming to know another person. This also suggests that one’s efforts to wholeheartedly
desire union with God constitutes an acquaintance with God that is a part of a progressive
religious experience. Therefore, in one’s becoming wholehearted, she is acquainting
herself with God.
Characterizing union with God as a shared attention that is analogous to knowing
another person helps clarify the epistemic dimension of union. It is in and through
different levels of shared attention that one becomes acquainted with God. This
acquaintance then yields an established pattern of interactions that deepens one’s
perception of God’s presence in her own life and in the world. Knowledge of God by
acquaintance as analogous to knowledge of persons further demonstrates how union with
God yields knowledge of God by acquaintance.
Wholeheartedness and Acquaintance with God
Thus far I have demonstrated that union with God yields an acquaintance with
God that constitutes a knowledge for oneself. This union with God entails a shared
attention, vulnerability, self-revelation, and closeness that requires a volitional structure
that prioritizes one’s desire for union with God over other possibly conflicting first-order
desires. This volitional structure describes a wholehearted person whose desires are in
harmony with the second-order desire for union with God. Furthermore, the shared
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attention between a wholehearted person and God within union characterizes a religious
experience where knowing God is much like knowing a person. Therefore, it is in and
through this union and shared attention that one comes to know God.
This seems to suggest that one must be wholehearted before she can be unified
with God and thus know God through acquaintance. Yet it is intuitive to say that even a
person who may be conflicted about her desire to be in union with God comes to know
God to some degree for herself. So it is through the process of becoming wholehearted
that one also becomes acquainted with God. This is because in becoming wholehearted
one desires to have the will that desires union with God and asks God’s aid in willing the
volitional structure needed for a strenuous union. For the purposes of brevity, I will refer
to this process of becoming wholehearted as sanctification.30 The remainder of this
section will demonstrate how becoming wholehearted within one’s sanctification
constitutes an acquaintance with God. This will also help clarify just how
wholeheartedness may be considered a constitutive intellectual virtue.
The acquaintance with God one obtains through her sanctification is a common
religious experience because, as I noted before, it is not typical of most people to already
possess wholeheartedness. The will is usually divided by conflicts between one’s firstorder and second-order desires. So one must progressively become wholehearted in order

30. I am using the term sanctification as a shorthand term for the process of becoming
wholehearted with the aid of God’s cooperative grace. This shorthand use of the term by no means
encompasses a comprehensive or robust concept of sanctification. I am also forgoing any traditional
Christian understanding of sanctification and am merely using it for the purposes of demonstrating that in
the process of becoming wholehearted one comes to know God. It is in this way that one does not have to
be completely wholehearted before she can experience God’s presence for herself. I do not mean to provide
an exhaustive definition of the term or limit what it encompasses.
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to obtain union with God, but it is in and through this process that one is acquainted with
God. This is because sanctification involves the cooperative grace of God.
It is possible for a person to love something but, at the same time, also have a
desire not to love that thing. Part of her loves it while another part of herself does not.31 If
a person is ambivalent about her love of God or her desire to know God, then she will be
unable to function epistemically well.32 Her perception of God will be undermined by this
division. So how can the division be resolved? How does one move from a divided will
to an integrated one?33
For people in the Christian tradition such as Augustine and Aquinas, the solution
is God’s cooperative grace. Sanctification is based on the belief that when a person’s will
is not strong enough to bring his first-order desires into harmony with his second-order
desires, it is strong enough to enable him to form the first-order desire to ask God to
strengthen his will.34 If he were to will that God help him, then God would certainly do
so. God bestows the grace to strengthen a person’s will for added power to will some
particular good in response to that person’s higher-order desire that God do so. In
bestowing this grace, God is cooperating with a person’s own higher-order desires to
strengthen the will. For example, Augustine in the Confessions commands his will to will
some good to which he is committed, but his will nonetheless does not will the thing it
31. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 91-92.
32. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 96. Frankfurt argues a similar point by stating that a divided
will is necessarily self-defeating. He makes the case that division of will is a counterpart in the realm of
conduct to self-contradiction in the realm of thought. A self-contradictory belief requires us to both accept
and deny the same judgment. Thus, it guarantees cognitive failure.
33. Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 131-32.
34. This is to say that God is always willing to aid the will of any person who wants God to
strengthen him in his willing of the good.
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has commanded.35 If Augustine petitions God for help in his struggle with his divided
self, then God can and will bring about changes in his will so that he is then enabled or
empowered to bring his first-order desires into accordance with his own second-order
desires. It is in and through this process that Augustine integrates his will around union
with God and achieves wholeheartedness.36
However, does God’s empowering of a human person to move from a fragmented
volitional state to a unified one not undermine wholeheartedness as a virtue by
undermining human free will? Cooperative grace does not undermine free will because it
is the case that one’s desire for internal integration originates within the person himself
and not God. This is because God does not simply produce a first-order volition in
Augustine without his already having a second-order desire that God do so. If that were
the case, then God would be undermining Augustine’s free will. Rather, the grace
operative in one’s sanctification enhances or evokes one’s efforts (or will) to integrate his
own will.37 If Augustine’s second-order desire had been different, then God would not
have acted on his will in such a way, and Augustine’s first-order desires would have been
different also. If God aids Augustine’s will because Augustine himself wants God to help
him have the state of will he himself wants to have, then the resulting will in Augustine is
the one he himself desires. We can also expect that Augustine would have this second-

35. Saint Augustine, The Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
147-48.
36. Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 160.
37. For further reading on how cooperative grace and a libertarian conception of free will are
related, see Eleonore Stump, “Chapter 13: Grace and Free Will,” in Aquinas (London: Routledge, 2003),
389-404.
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order desire to will the will that desires union with God because of human reason’s
access to the objective good.38
It seems that if this were correct, then with one act of a higher-order desire a
person could achieve full integration of her will around the good if she would only desire
that God unify her will in this way. However, a person’s will is recurrently liable to
internal division. A second-order desire for help in willing some particular good can be
wavering. Even a higher-order desire for a good first-order will that is not wavering can
still fade or fall away.39 Consequently, the process of full internal integration is a slow
one. The higher-order desire for some particular good first-order desire on the part of
some person Sarah and her desire for God’s aid in strengthening her in that willing will
result in some integration of her will. As Sarah’s higher-order desires become effective in
their command of Sarah’s first-order desires, and as Sarah’s will becomes more
integrated, Sarah will be able to form further first-order desires that further her will’s
integration around the good. As such, God can give Sarah more aid to strengthen her will
still more in willing what Sarah increasingly wants to will; and this strengthening of her
volitional structure will enable Sarah to desire even more cooperative grace, and so on.
Therefore, wholeheartedness is something that is grown into and, like any other virtue, is
cultivated over the course of one’s lifetime.40

38. This also seems strenuous insofar as one’s second-order desire for the objective good is
explicitly stated as union with God. However, one does not need to be consciously aware of the explicit
nature of the objective good in order to desire it. One can be in the process of unifying oneself with God
before fully comprehending or recognizing that it is God with whom they are being unified. This explicit
awareness would better characterize the deepest level of religious experience.
39. Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 161.
40. Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 161. For Aquinas, sanctification is never completed in this
lifetime but is brought to completion in the afterlife.
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If sanctification is a cooperation with God towards a common goal of integrating
one’s will so that one may be unified with God, then sanctification is a kind of shared
attention between God and the person who is becoming wholehearted. By asking for and
receiving the help of God to have the will that she wants to have, one increasingly
becomes unified with God and thus acquainted with God. So it is in and through one’s
wholeheartedness that one apprehends a pattern of God’s presence and attention in her
life that she would otherwise not be able to. One comes to know God as an actor within
her own life and in such an intimate way that the acquaintance involves her own personal
growth.
One way of clarifying the knowledge-constitutive nature of sanctification is to
apply the Causal-Acquaintance Principle (CA). J. P. Moreland provides this definition of
CA: necessarily, if a subject s has knowledge by acquaintance with a causal fact x, then s
has knowledge by acquaintance with the relevant causal object y. For example, if s is
directly aware of a hammer’s causing a nail to move, then s is directly aware of the
hammer.41 Brandon Rickabaugh takes Moreland to be arguing that a subject’s direct
awareness of the hammer moving the nail yields knowledge that the hammer moved the
nail. Thus the hammer moving the nail provides the relevant phenomenological seemings
and appearings that justify one’s belief that the hammer caused the nail to move. Since
these relevant phenomenological seemings play such a justificatory role, CA can be said
to be an instance of knowledge by acquaintance.42

41. J. P. Moreland, “Substance Dualism and the Argument from Self-Awareness,” Philosophia
Christi 13, no. 1 (2011): 28.
42. Rick L. Rickabaugh, “Eternal Life as Knowledge of God: An Epistemology of Knowledge by
Acquaintance and Spiritual Formation,” Journal of Spiritual Formation & Soul Care 6, no. 2 (2013): 212.
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While Rickabaugh makes a similar move by applying CA to awareness of the
Holy Spirit, I argue that CA best describes how becoming wholehearted yields
knowledge of God by acquaintance. If a person is aware of the integration of her desires,
though she feels powerless to change the direction or strength of her first-order desires,
she can be said to be aware of the causal agent of that integration. In the case of
sanctification, that causal agent is God.43 So it is through the basic identification of one
with the desires of her heart that she comes to know God. One becomes directly aware of
God’s action and presence through the integration of her will. Furthermore, this
acquaintance with God provides a non-propositional cognitive foundation for knowledge
of God, not only as a reality, but as an agent, as an actor in one’s life. Through this
acquaintance, one can pick up on the pattern of God’s actions and presence in her own
experiences so that God becomes a personal god. In this way one possesses the salient
evidence for the belief that God is a personal God.
Wholeheartedness as a Constitutive Virtue
What this discussion has lent so far is a conception of sanctification that yields
knowledge of God by acquaintance. It is in and through one’s sanctification that one
becomes acquainted with God. Therefore, knowledge of God by acquaintance is not
gained merely through a cognitive faculty that subsequently produces knowledge of God
after one’s integration of will. It seems more plausible given the process of sanctification
that I have laid out, and the union it entails, that it is in and through one’s becoming

43. Stump, Aquinas, 391-93. Of course, this claim is qualified with the understanding that God
remains the formal cause rather than the efficient cause so that God is not compelling the will or acting any
violence against it. This qualification allows the claim to be made while maintaining a commitment to a
libertarian sense of free will.
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wholehearted that one gains knowledge of God by acquaintance. This is how we can
make good on the claim that in growing in love of God, one grows in knowledge of God.
By revisiting Jason Baehr’s work, we can better see how this is the case. The
account of wholeheartedness given above is best identified by what Baehr calls an
epistemic contributor.44 One way to better understand what Baehr means by epistemic
contributor is to distinguish it from another conception of intellectual virtue, which
describes character traits as mere epistemic enablers. According to Ernest Sosa, epistemic
enablers are qualities that put one in a position to know or in a position where one can
subsequently exercise one’s knowledge-producing faculties. In contrast, epistemic
contributors are qualities in virtue of which one knows.45 While Sosa appears to be open
to the possibility that character traits can act as epistemic contributors, it is only in rare or
non-standard cases. Baehr argues against this claim by asserting that it is not in rare or
unusual cases that the exercise of character traits constitutes an item of knowledge.46
Baehr maintains that character virtues regularly manifest in cognitive acts in
belief-formation processes that are not necessarily passive or automatic. In intentional,
judgmental belief-formation non-passive, cognitive acts such as judging, perceiving,
noticing, and grasping are knowledge-constitutive. These are the knowledge-constitutive
cognitive performances in which character traits are manifested. There could a case in
which a person notices an important visual cue or detail on account of his focused
attention. It is not as if this person exercises attentiveness and then, only subsequently,
44. Jason Baehr, “How Are Virtue and Knowledge Related?” in Current Controversies in Virtue
Theory, ed., Mark Alfano (New York City: Routledge, 2015), 75.
45. Baehr, “How Are Virtue and Knowledge Related?” 77.
46. Baehr, “How Are Virtue and Knowledge Related?” 78.
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sees the relevant detail. Rather, attentiveness is manifested in the act of visual perception
itself.47 So it is in or through focused or attentive looking that the detail is perceived.
There could be yet another case in which, through an act of honest introspection, a person
becomes aware of the fact that she doubts a certain claim that she has long taken herself
to firmly believe. Given these cases, it would be misguided to say that this person
manifests intellectual honesty and then becomes aware of the relevant fact in a separate
cognitive act. Instead, it is in and through her introspective honesty that this person
grasps her doubt.48
Both cases underscore a crucial insight from Baehr: the exercise or manifestation
of character virtues cannot be divorced from the operation of perceptual or other
cognitive faculties such as introspection and reason.49 Wholeheartedness is also an
instance of a trait that is manifested in the perception of God’s action within one’s life
and one’s union with God such that it is knowledge-constitutive. This means that it is in
and through one’s wholeheartedness that one grasps her acquaintance with God. So it is
just like the attentive observer and the honest introspective person who come to
knowledge through their traits that the wholehearted person comes to know God through
her desire for internal integration around union with God. It is not the case that one
becomes wholehearted or internally integrated and that one then is disposed to perceive
or apprehend God. Rather, one’s growth in wholeheartedness encompasses one’s
acquaintance with God.
47. Baehr, “How Are Virtue and Knowledge Related?” 81.
48. Baehr, “How Are Virtue and Knowledge Related?” 82.
49. Baehr, “How Are Virtue and Knowledge Related?” 82.

56

Conclusion
In the preceding, I have demonstrated that wholeheartedness is constitutive of
knowledge of God by acquaintance. Since wholeheartedness is an internal integration
around the objective good and the objective good for a human person is union with God,
wholeheartedness aims at acquaintance with God. Union entails a shared attention and
closeness with God that yields an intimate knowledge of God for oneself. This
knowledge is specific to the individual agent in the sense that one cannot discursively
transfer her acquaintance with God to another subject. Union with God yields a
knowledge of God by acquaintance. This knowledge by acquaintance is further clarified
by likening this coming to know God to coming to know another person. As such, when
one’s shared attention with God deepens, her acquaintance with God deepens. The more
she is acquainted with God, the more she recognizes and is aware of God.
However, this shared attention requires a vulnerability to and closeness with God
that is difficult to obtain because the human will is divided by its conflicting desires. If
one is not wholeheartedly integrated around her desire for union with God, then her
acquaintance with God will be undermined. One must become wholehearted in order to
maintain this union. Yet it is through becoming wholehearted that one becomes
acquainted with God. This is because God’s cooperative grace is needed for one to fully
integrate her desires so that she has the will that wills union with God. This cooperation
is an instance of the Causal-Acquaintance Principle, where one has knowledge by
acquaintance of God when one is aware that God is helping move one’s will toward
integration. This clarifies that becoming wholehearted is a constitutive intellectual virtue.
One comes to know God in and through her wholeheartedness.
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Wholeheartedness gets at the core of the volitional aspect of our epistemic lives.
Understanding, recognizing, and perceiving God, like knowing another person, comes in
degrees because it requires much of one’s volitional character to achieve a more
strenuous degree of union. Other religious epistemologists have also gone to great lengths
to demonstrate the volitional aspect of our epistemic lives, especially when it comes to
theistic inquiry. I will spend my concluding chapter placing my account of
wholeheartedness and its volitional aspects in conversation with Paul Moser, whose work
has revolutionized the way we think about theistic inquiry. Like me, Moser emphasizes
the volitional dimension of theistic inquiry by claiming that knowledge of God and the
evidence that justifies it requires volitional openness to God. While many of the intuitions
underlying this project are in debt to Moser, I believe that Moser’s account can be
streamlined by my own. It is to this task that I turn in the concluding chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
An Account of Wholeheartedness and Knowledge of God
What I have done in this thesis is demonstrate that wholeheartedness is a
constitutive intellectual virtue. I advance this claim by first establishing the definition of
intellectual virtue as a character trait that contributes to an individual’s personal
intellectual worth. Intellectual virtues contribute to one’s deep and abiding desire for
things such as truth, knowledge, and understanding. Furthermore, as a result of this
orientation, one functions epistemically well. Therefore, for a trait to be an intellectual
virtue, it must positively orient one toward epistemic goods to a motivating degree. Each
trait must also have its own psychological characteristics that distinguish it from other
traits.
Moving from this concept of intellectual virtue, I describe the particular
psychological traits of wholeheartedness by drawing upon Harry Frankfurt’s account of
love for the self. Wholeheartedness is a matter of personally identifying with what one
desires in such a way that it becomes a trumping desire and allows one to function
epistemically well. One can pursue the epistemic goods toward which she aims without
conflict or hindrance. The wholehearted person is wholly settled as to what she wants,
and what she cares about. Wholeheartedness consists of a definite and unified volitional
structure that contributes to one’s personal intellectual worth by positively orienting her
toward the epistemic goods she identifies with. Wholeheartedness organizes the hierarchy

59

of one’s desires so that she is compelled to remain persistent in her commitment and
pursuit of epistemic goods. Furthermore, given the objective standard of goodness,
wholeheartedness also describes a person who aims toward union with God as her
ultimate flourishing and objective good.
Since wholeheartedness consists of a hierarchy of the will that prioritizes a desire
for union with God, wholeheartedness aims towards the epistemic good of acquaintance.
I demonstrate this by drawing a constitutive relationship between union and
acquaintance. Union with God yields a knowledge of God by acquaintance. The
significant personal presence and closeness that is entailed within union with God
constitutes an acquaintance with God, which produces a knowledge-for-oneself of God.
The shared attention of significant personal presence is much like knowing another
person. One comes to know God in and through her union with God. Likewise, one
comes to a knowledge of God by acquaintance through her union with God.
However, this union and acquaintance with God is shot through with a complex
array of volitional dispositions. It is easier said than done that one be vulnerable and close
to God. For one to be in union with God, she must possess a will that prioritizes her
desire for union with God against conflicting desires to be reserved and aloof towards
God. Yet one can become wholehearted through the assistance of God’s cooperative
grace. By desiring that one have a will that wills union with God, she cooperates with
God toward this wholeheartedness. As one becomes aware of her volitional structure’s
changing, she also becomes aware of God’s presence. This sanctification produces a
pattern of interactions with God over time that constitute an acquaintance with God,
where acquaintance is an aptitude of recognition, belief formation, and understanding
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carried via memory and other faculties that is consequent on and subsequent to an earlier
immediate cognitive contact or awareness of an object of knowledge. In this way
wholeheartedness is an epistemic contributor. It is in and through one’s becoming
wholehearted that she comes to know God. It is not the case that she becomes
wholehearted to only then, through the function of cognitive faculties, gain acquaintance
with God. Therefore, it is through one’s progressive union with God that she obtains
knowledge of God that she otherwise would not have.
Through this account of wholeheartedness, the volitional aspects of theistic
inquiry are revealed. If one is to come to knowledge of God for herself, then she must
engage in the integration of her desires. Paul Moser undertakes a similar project by
making the case that volitional openness is necessary for what he calls filial knowledge of
God. In this final chapter, I will place my account of wholeheartedness in conversation
with Moser’s volitional theistic evidentialism with regard to acquiring knowledge of God.
While Moser’s intuition that acquiring knowledge of God has an existential, volitional,
and ethical dimension is right, Moser does not state in a coherent or precise manner how
one comes to be volitionally open to God. I believe that conceiving of wholeheartedness
as an intellectual virtue will streamline Moser’s religious epistemology. My analysis of
Moser’s religious epistemology will begin with a brief discussion of volitional theistic
evidentialism and will then draw out the potential weaknesses of his concept of volitional
openness. I will then demonstrate the ways in which my account of wholeheartedness as
a constitutive intellectual virtue help address the lacuna left in Moser’s. Finally, I will use
this conversation as an entre for further inquiry into related areas of concern.
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Volitional Theistic Evidentialism
For Moser, filial knowledge requires an inquirer’s volitional reception of the selfmanifestation of a perfectly moral God. The purposively available evidence that grounds
such filial knowledge and that constitutes the volitional reception of God’s selfmanifestation is one’s volitional and moral transformation. Therefore, filial knowledge is
inherently personal and adds qualitative content to one’s knowledge of God.
However, Moser fails to clearly organize these steps of inquiry into a coherent
process of acquiring filial knowledge of God. As a result, the epistemic significance of
volitional openness is obscured. Moser insists that knowledge of God requires a
volitional reception of God’s self-manifestation that is evident through a subsequent
moral transformation of the inquirer. At the same time, he argues that volitional openness
is antecedent to the self-manifestation of a perfectly moral God.
My account aids Moser’s in three fundamental ways: first, by integrating virtue
epistemology, I organize the steps of inquiry about God into a coherent process of
becoming wholehearted. By making the case that one comes to know God through the
integration of her will, my account more clearly illustrates how one comes to be
volitionally open to God. In becoming wholehearted, one is desiring union with God as
her ultimate flourishing in a way that trumps her lesser, first-order desires. Secondly, by
conceiving of wholeheartedness as a constitutive intellectual virtue, my account offers
clarity to the chronological order of volitional openness and the acquisition of knowledge
by acquaintance. In and through one’s wholeheartedness one comes to know God.
While filial knowledge of God may strike readers as an important aspect of the
Christian epistemic life, Moser fails to tie this to other concepts within the field of
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epistemology and leaves interlocutors a bit plussed regarding what exactly volitional
openness aims at, epistemically speaking. By clarifying that wholeheartedness aims at
acquaintance with God and that this acquaintance is much like coming to know another
person, my project better establishes the epistemic dimension of volitional openness. The
volitional and epistemic are integrated into a coherent process of acquiring knowledge of
God. By clarifying the epistemic good to which wholeheartedness aims, my account also
maintains a better balance of epistemic goods regarding God (e.g., propositional
knowledge, warranted belief, understanding, sense perception). Moser tends to reduce
inquiry about God to an existential crisis of sorts; I would like to maintain the important
role of intellectual tasks such as rigorous philosophical reflection, natural theology, the
rationality of religious belief, the nature of religious experience in acquiring knowledge
of God.
Defining Filial Knowledge
Moser introduces the concept of filial knowledge of God as a volitional reception
of the firsthand, direct encounter with a morally perfect God in and through a mutual,
reciprocal relationship. What constitutes this firsthand, direct encounter with God is the
manifestation and the subsequent reception, of purposively available evidence.
Purposively available evidence is the volitional reception of God’s self-manifestation of
his will or love in one’s experience over time. Since God is morally perfect, his character
is perfect, unselfish love; thus a direct, firsthand encounter with God entails an encounter
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with perfect, unselfish love. This makes it the case that any manifestation of perfect,
unselfish love within one’s experience is a direct, firsthand encounter with God.1
So what does the volitional reception of the self-manifestation of God look like?
First, the self-manifestation of God to an inquirer and the inquirer’s subsequent decision
to receive such self-manifestation takes place within the context of what Moser calls the
God relationship. Just as in any relationship, the God relationship is mutual and
reciprocal. Given that God is morally perfect, this mutuality places a moral demand upon
human recipients. Being in the reciprocal God relationship where one could come to
know God would require one to imitate God’s perfect, unselfish love and thus be
reconciled to God (i.e., to be in cooperative communion with God). Therefore, the
process of inquiry within the God relationship is morally robust due to the demand of
reciprocity with a morally perfect God. Upon entry to this relationship, one finds that her
motivational attitudes such as desires, intentions, and feelings are challenged by the
morally perfect nature of God. The result of any morally robust inquiry into God would
be a serious reflection on how one orders her life and priorities. Subsequent to this
reflection would be one’s volitional decision to reorient oneself toward God as supremely
authoritative in one’s life.2 One’s decision to conform one’s will to God then is what is
entailed in the volitional reception or acceptance of the self-manifestation of God.
Therefore, one’s moral transformation is inextricably intertwined with and taken up into
one’s inquiry about God.

1. Paul K. Moser, The Elusive God: Reorienting Religious Epistemology (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008), 135-36.
2. Paul K. Moser, The God Relationship: The Ethics for Inquiry about the Divine (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2017), 48.
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Since purposively available evidence is inherently volitional and ethical, its
content is qualitative in the sense that purposively available evidence must be salient to
one’s own experience. 3 It is inherently personal insofar as it is directly presented to one’s
will or heart. Purposively available evidence provides the qualia or input of one’s filial
knowledge of God.4 Filial knowledge of God is akin to a direct person-to-person knowing
that is constituted by one’s qualitative experience of another personal agent.5 This means
that purposively available evidence is not reproducible or necessarily demonstrable to
others. One person cannot present, give, or manifest purposively available evidence for
another because the salient evidence is the change of a person’s will toward the will of
God.6 Knowing God results in self-knowledge as well as moral transformation, and it is
this which constitutes one’s distinctive knowing of God as Father.
Volitional Inconsistencies
However, there is one major inconsistency within Moser’s model for acquiring
knowledge of God that threatens to undermine his project. He makes the case that in an
inquirer’s sincere inquiry about God, she could become more attentive to some important
character traits of God and thus cooperate with God in acquiring filial knowledge of God.
This cooperation entails the prioritizing of a supreme love of God. Thus being related to
God, the person could cooperatively receive firsthand, salient evidence of God’s reality.7
This attunement allows one to recognize God when God purposively decides to self3. Moser, The God Relationship, 305.
4. Moser, The God Relationship, 305.
5. Moser, The Elusive God, 154.
6. Moser, The Elusive God, 97.
7. Moser, The God Relationship, 43-46.
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manifest for the good of the inquirer. At the same time, Moser makes the case that one
cannot come to faith or filial knowledge of God until she has been morally overwhelmed
in either a positive or negative way. However, given a person’s past bad experiences, she
can easily make false associations with that moral overwhelming and thereby block a
genuine opportunity to realize goodness in her life. Moser argues that this person would
need to learn how to receive rather than resist good overwhelming in life even when it is
difficult.8
As such, it is unclear from Moser’s account just how one becomes volitionally
open to God and at what point in the inquiry process. On one hand, it seems that humans
must enter into a sincere inquiry about God that cultivates their attunement to God’s
character and thus receive firsthand, salient evidence of God’s reality. On the other hand,
a person can hinder the reception of this evidence due to her resistance caused by
negative past experiences. Furthermore, is it not the manifestation and subsequent
reception of God’s self-revelation that yields the ability to discern the nature and
presence of God in the first place? At the same time, Moser prescribes a discernment or
attunement to goodness that would correct someone’s association of moral
overwhelming. Yet one comes to possess this attunement in and through a cooperative
relationship with God in which she has already volitionally opened herself. How is one
able to come to a point of being able to discern the reality of God and thus volitionally
open herself to God if this attunement is available only for someone already within the
God relationship?

8. Moser, The God Relationship, 61.
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Response to Moser
My account of becoming wholehearted better addresses exactly how one comes to
be volitionally open to God by being knowledge constitutive. In Moser’s language, this is
the same as saying that one becomes progressively volitionally open as she becomes
more and more acquainted with God. However, the inquiry process for Moser is
convoluted insofar as it is not clear which prescription is a precondition for knowledge of
God. Must one already be attuned to God before she can recognize God’s self-revelation
when he finally decides to reveal himself to her? And if so, is it not in and through the
God relationship that she receives this ability to discern God’s presence in the first place?
Sanctification, as the process of becoming wholehearted, offers a better
alternative to conceptualizing the cooperative and mutual nature of encountering God
through its subtleties. Moser seems to be expecting a moral overwhelming of a great,
existential degree. However, in the life of most believers, the case is that God is
encountered through the small, almost mundane moments of life. Union with God entails
significant personal presence that consists of a shared attention. In becoming
wholehearted, God and an individual share attention by attending to the integration of her
desires around union with God. This attention and God’s cooperative grace, constitutes
an acquaintance with God that yields the filial knowledge Moser is concerned with.
Through this intimate attention and union, one comes to know God as Father, where her
knowledge of God is unique to the pattern of interactions she has with God. This may
include the existential struggle that Moser describes, but it also encompasses something
as simple and subtle as one’s coming to a self-knowledge about who she is and what she
takes to be ultimately authoritative for her.
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The common experience of coming to know God in this way is also underlined by
its centrality to the Christian life. Since the human will is typically divided rather than
wholehearted, the process of becoming wholehearted is paramount to the Christian
concerned with union with God. Given this state of affairs, knowledge of God and the
transformation that it entails must be a simultaneous, diachronic process. It is through
one’s transformation that one grows in knowledge of God by acquaintance, and as she
grows in acquaintance, she is further transformed. Therefore, wholeheartedness and
acquaintance with God are mutually benefitting. Sanctification demonstrates that the
process of becoming volitionally open to God happens alongside one’s growing
acquaintance with God.
Furthermore, this acquaintance with God more clearly demonstrates that this
transformation encompasses more than just a moral transformation. In sanctification,
what is at issue is one’s personal identification, rather than her moral status.9 From our
discussion of intellectual virtue, we know that not all excellence is moral in nature. There
is still a way to be personally excellent without there being any direct link to one’s
morality. So acquiring a deeper acquaintance with God requires a volitional overhaul,
where what desires one identifies with is transformed.
By conceptualizing the human person as a rational creature, one’s determination
of her second-order desires is made through the intellect, which recognizes the objective
good. This is not to say that one immediately and automatically recognizes God as the
objective good or fully understands what that entails. It simply means that one grows in
9. This is not to say that sanctification has absolutely no effect on one’s morality. Rather, the point
is that the volitional dimension of acquiring knowledge of God by acquaintance has to do with what one
identifies with and what she finds to be most important. In the case of wholeheartedness, it would be her
own flourishing, or union with God.
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perception and desire of God, in degrees, through the interdependent relationship of the
will and intellect.10 Conceptualizing sanctification as a matter of transforming the desires
one identifies with clarifies what exactly it means to be volitionally open to God. By
integrating my account with Moser’s, we can better determine that becoming volitionally
open to God is a matter of desiring that one’s will is conformed to God’s will or
identifying with the ultimate desire for union with God.
Since becoming wholehearted is a matter of determining that one ultimately
desires union with God and having God’s assistance in this determination, acquaintance
with God is not far removed from the everyday patterns or schemata of one’s life. While
Moser is not wrong that this transformation can be manifested through a positive or
negative overwhelming, the process of sanctification brings with it a more nuanced
expectation of how one becomes acquainted with God. It is in and through one’s struggle
to will the will that wills union with God that one encounters God.
Sanctification as an internal process of identifying more and more with God better
describes the struggle that Moser claims to be entailed within inquiry about God. It also
reveals how background beliefs about oneself, what one wants, and what one expects can
exacerbate this struggle and undermine acquaintance with God by furthering alienating
one from herself. According to the shared attention model of union, throwing out
evidence of God’s presence available at the most basic level of human spiritual
development impedes gaining further evidence that is grasped as the relationship with
10. The doctrine of justification states that God first reveals to the intellect what is good and thus
sets one’s second-order desires around God. The doctrine of justification and sanctification work in tandem
to clarify just how one comes to faith and continues to grow in that faith, through love. However, a
discussion of justification is beyond the scope of this project. It is enough to indicate that the intellect still
plays a role in acquiring knowledge of God by acquaintance. This augments Moser’s account by
considering every aspect of the human person rather than reducing inquiry about God to existential and
moral transformation.
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God progresses. So if we assume that coming to know God is nothing short of an ecstatic
experience, then we will not recognize God in the smaller moments of personal growth.11
It follows that if one’s experience of God is shallow and the history short, then
deflationary schemas can be introduced to remake one’s memories and damage trust
between her and God.12
For this reason intellectual tasks such as those germane to natural theology and
philosophy of religion are part and parcel of one’s growing acquaintance with God.13
Propositional knowledge and a systematic understanding of those propositions still play a
role in coming to know God, though not in the constitutive nature as sanctification.
Philosophical reflection on the nature of God and his relationship to human beings can
present a new schema for the will to follow. One does not need to necessarily undergo a
moral overwhelming to begin unifying herself with God. This union can begin in
something as simple as wanting to discover for oneself what experiencing God might
entail. If one learns through her studies that God can be encountered through the process
of becoming wholehearted, then one will be able to pick up on this schema. As such,
even the pursuit of analytic philosophy and theology can have salvific effects.14
11. Green, “Hiddenness,” 148.
12. Green, “Hiddenness,” 148.
13. In different places, such as “The Inner Witness of the Spirit,” Moser claims that philosophical
arguments and conclusions can hinder purposively available evidence of God or distract from direct
interpersonal knowledge of God, so Moser tends to prioritize the volitional over the cognitive. However, it
was the intention of my thesis simply to clarify the volitional dimension of acquiring knowledge of God,
while maintaining the equal importance and role of both the volitional and cognitive in the epistemic life of
the Christian.
14. For a more in-depth study of how analytic philosophy and theology can have salvific effects,
see William Wood, “Analytic Theology as a Way of Life,” Journal of Analytic Theology 2 (May 2014): 4360. While I agree with Wood about the ways in which analytic theology can have salvific and transforming
effects, Wood does not enter the epistemological debate between an auxiliary or constitutive trait.
However, Wood’s work is still helpful insofar as he illustrates the way analytic theology cultivates the
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However, there is one area of inquiry that both Moser and I never explicitly
address. After looking more analytically at what it means to become volitionally open to
God, we still find room for a discussion about the practices that are entailed in becoming
volitionally open. There needs to be further conversation about the everyday practices
and habits involved in the process of becoming wholehearted and the role that each one
plays. Are there certain practices that are more beneficial than others? What about the
nature of these practices? Do they simply dispose one towards wholeheartedness, or are
these practices major contributors to one’s sanctification? This thesis also calls for further
reflection on what can be drawn from the Christian tradition in terms of practices and
habits. Some theologians are beginning to address these specific questions by drawing
upon the larger Christian tradition, its writers, and more specifically, the mystical branch
of Christian theology. For example, Sarah Coakley has done extensive work on the role
contemplative prayer plays in coming to know God.15 Her work also opens the possibility
for further investigation into the role suffering plays in coming to know God. There are
also other analytic philosophers and theologians who continue to look at the connection
between philosophy and spirituality as a point of interest for religious epistemologists.
These thinkers have made the case that philosophical and theological study may have
similar salvific effects as traditional Christian practices. The work of people such as

character traits that are manifestations of one’s acquaintance with God (i.e., wisdom, attentiveness,
patience, courage).
15. For further reading see Sarah Coakley, “Dark Contemplation and Epistemic Transformation:
The Analytic Theologian Re-Meets Teresa of Avila,” in Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy
of Theology, eds., Oliver D. Crisp and Michael C. Rea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 280-312;
also see, Sarah Coakley, “Divine hiddenness or dark intimacy? How John of the Cross dissolves a
contemporary philosophical dilemma,” in Hidden Divinity and Religious Belief: New Perspectives, eds.,
Eleonore Stump and Adam Green (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 229-46.
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William Wood would be worth further investigation as it relates to wholeheartedness and
volitional openness.16

16. William Wood, “Analytic Theology as a Way of Life,” Journal of Analytic Theology 2 (May
2014), 43-60.
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